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INTRODUCTION.
Political liistory has two functions: to narrate and to inter-
pret "past politics". This paper is an attempt to deal with a
scarcely-closed chapter of American political history: the life
of the Progressive Party of 1912. The aim throughout has been
not so much to narrate the events in the life of the party as to
interpret Progressivism ; to show how it came to be, and what it
has meant in American politics. Narration has thus been subordi-
nated to interpretation. At times a detailed narration of events
has seemed necessary to make possible intelligible interpretation;
other periods and events have been passed over hurriedly, as not
being of vital significance. Thus a large proportion of this
whole study deals with the background, the beginnings, and the
rise of Progressivism; because without an intelligent grasp of
these factors the Progressive Party of 1912 can not be fully un-
derstood.
One digression has been made, in the intensive study of the
text of the Progressive Platform; this seemed to call for some-
what detailed treatment, v/hen the remarkable and all but unknown
variations in the text of the Platform^ were accidentally discov-
ered
.
This effort to interpret the Progressive Party is, of course,
by no means exhaustive; it is rather an attempt to place in proper
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THIRD-PARTY PREDECESSORS OF THE PROGRESSIVES.
The Progressive Party of 1913 appeared as the youngest rep-
resentative of a long line of American "third parties". Though the
dual party system has ruled in America from the beginning (1), yet
"third" or minor parties have entered the field in a majority of the
presidential campaigns from 1789 through 1912. (3)
Ignoring those third parties which were too small or short-
lived to be of any practical political importance^ we shall see that
the remainder of them fall naturally into two general chronological
groups: the parties of the Middle Period, preceding the Civil far,
and the more modern and recent parties that have sprung up in the
new era following the War and Reconstruction.
The third parties of the Middle Period are pretty clearly
of two distinct types: first transitory parties of protest, and
second, the parties born of the growing Horthern sentiment of oppo-
sition to slavery.
The first transitory party of protest — and likewise the
progenitor of the whole line of American minor parties — was the
Anti-Masonic Party, which in 1832 emerged from the political con-
(1) Andrew C. McLaughlin & Albert Bushnell Hart — Cyclopedia of
American Government III, 533 "Third Parties" (Maoy).
(2) Third parties participated in the campaigns of 1853, 1840, 1844
1848, 1853, 1856, 1860, 1864, 1872 and in every election there-
after. No real minor party appeared in any national election
before 1853, nor in 1836 or 1868. cf. McKee, National Convent-
ions and Platforms; Stanwood, History of the Presidency, History
of the Presidency, 1897- 1909.

3fusion of tha parlod as a party opposed, as its name implies, to
nroemasonry. This Party would seem to have given a sufficient guar-
antee of its early demise in the faot that its one candidate for the
presidenoy was himself actually an announced Freemason ;(1) at any
rate, the Party seems to have been, throughout its brief existence,
more or less allied to the National Republicems, and after 1833 the
Anti -Masons gradually and quietly subsided into the Whig opposition
to Jackson. (3)
Twenty years after the Anti -Masons came the second party of
protest. Opposition to foreign (and particularly Roman Catholic)
influence in Americain politics led to the establishment of a secret
order which appeared in the national campaign of 1856 as the Native
American or "Know-Nothing" Party. The peculiar conditions attend-
ing the disintegration of the Whig Party and the rise of Republican-
ism gave the Know-Nothings a momentary importance which was promptly
eclipsed, after 1856, in the re-alignment of all political forces
on the slavery issue. (3)
More important than these transitory parties of protest was
the succession of anti-slavery third parties during the twenty years
preceding the Civil War.
(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt, I, 49 "Anti-Masonic Party" (Mac Donald)
(3) ibid. I, 49-50.
(3) ibid, I, 37-38 "American Party" (Mac Donald) II, 281 "Know-
Nothing Party" (MacOonald.)

3Abolitionist sentiment first found national politioal ex-
pression in the Abolitionist Party of 1840 and the Liberty Party of
1844. (1) In 1848 the Liberty Party was "swallowed up* by the or-
ganization of the Free Soil Party, with its slogan of "Ro more slave
(1) It is difficult to determine the exact status of the Liberty
Party in the development of the Northern opposition to slavery.
Were the Liberty men Abolitionists masquerading under another
name, or are they rather to be identified in their beliefs with
the later Free Soilers and Republicans? Obviously, there was
a close connection between the Abolitionists of 1840 and the
Libertv men of 1844, for in each case the same man (Jaimes G.
Birney) was nominated for President, Stanwood refers to both
parties as "Abolitionists* (Presidency 308, 316) and speaks
of "the Liberty, or Abolition party" only in mentioning the
final abortive Liberty nomination of 1848. (ibid. 333). Theo-
dore Clark Smith, on the other hand, includes the Abolition-
ists of 1840 in the Liberty Party movement, and tends to rs-
gard the Liberty men primarily as precursors of the Republicans.
Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348, "Liberty Party" (T.C. Smith).
Cf. also the somewhat non-committal statements in T.C. Smith,
The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest 4-5, 398-
300. HoKee treats these anti -slavery men as Abolitionists
in 1840 and "Liberty-Abolitionists" in 1844, MoKee, National
Conventions suid Platforms 43,51. The Liberty Party Platform
of 1844 (contained in McKee, op, cit., 51-55) can not be said
to go very far towards clearing up the matter. While most
of its planks do set forth the later Republican doctrines,
apparently" admitting the impregnable existence of slavery in
the states" (Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348 "Liberty Party" —
T.C. Smith)
,
yet the platform also says "That the Liberty party
has not been organized merely for the overthrow o^ slavery"
(italics ours); and it later refers to the men of the Party
specifically "as Abolitionists". Perhaps the best that we
can say is that the Liberty Party was one important step in
the transition from Political Abolitionism to Free Soilism
and Republicanism, and that the inclusion by the Liberty Party
of men of both shades of opinion was reflected in the self-in-
consistent platform of 1844,

4states; no slave territory". (1) The Free Soil Party was domi-
nated largely by the Van Buren "Barnburner" (anti-Polk) Demoorats
of New York. In the "business truce" to slavery which followed the
Compromise of 1850 (3) , most of these Democrats returned to their
former allegiance. The more radical an ti-slavery men (probably the
remnant of the old Liberty Party) nursed the Free Soil organization
through the Democratic triumph of 1853, and in 1854 the movement was
merged in the rise of the Republican Party. (3)
The Republioain Party is the only American third party
that ever succeeded in rising to the position of a major party. (4)
(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348 "Liberty Party": 53. "Free Soil
Party" (T.C. Smith) ,
r o x
(3) Muzzey, David Saville — American History 367
(5) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 53-53; III, 189,
(4) The Whig Party (including under that term the National Re-
publicans) is no exception to this statement, for the Whigsbegan life as a major party, opposed to the dominant Jackson-lan Democrats; hence, they never served a third-party appren-
ticeship. The Republicans, on the other hand, began th*irhistory as a real third party. The Republican Party was or-ganized in 1854, when life was not quite extinct in the Whigs -
the traditional "second party" of the Middle Period. In the
election of 1856, however, the Republicans received 114
electoral votes as against 8 cast for Fillmore, the Whig andKnow-Hothing candidate. (Stanwood, Presidency 376). This
completed the extinction of the Whigs, and the Republicans
took their place as the major party opposing the Democrats:but we believe that from 1854 to 1856 the Republican Party,properly speaking, was a "third" party. For a similar use
of the term, cf. Ray, who, writing (in 1913) of the campaign
of 1913, calls the Progressive Party "a » third* although not
a minor* party." Ray, Introduction to Political Parties and
Practical Politics 43.

5Born in 1854, the new party ran seoond only to the Democrats in
1856, captured the presidency in 1860, preserved the Union of the
States by conducting the Civil War to a successful conclusion, and
has been successful in eight of the eleven presidential elections
held since the close of the War, The Republican Party is of
peculiar interest to the student of the Progressive Pairty of 1913,
and in the latter part of this chapter we shall have occasion to
examine the causes which led to the unique success of the Repub-
licans.
We must not leave the ante-bellum third peirties of the
United States without a passing mention of the Constitutional
Union Party of 1860. The Constitutional Unionists were not an anti-
slavery party, but they were distinctly a product of the struggle
over slavery.
The Whigs were almost annihilated by the Democratic
triumph of 1853. In the inevitable period of confusion attending
the disintegration of the Whig Party, the Know-Nothings assumed for
the moment a formidable appearance, though they were able to make
but little showing against the Republicans in 1856, — the initial
campaign for both of these parties. The Know-Nothing movement
collapsed as quickly as it had expanded, and in 1860 the lines were
sharply drawn on the slavery question.
The Constitutional Union Party represented the residuum
of Whigs and Know-Nothings who even yet were unable to make up their
minds upon slavery. The Constitutional Unionists were the last men
off the fence." With the firing upon Sumter, their pious reliance

6upon "the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States,
and the enforcement of the laws* (1) proved as chimerical as the
desire of some of border states for "neutrality" in the coming
conflict. In each case, flying shots caused the hopeful "neutrals*
to drop on one side of the fence or the other, and thus brought to
an abrupt end the existence of the Constitutional Union Party. (2)
Our second chronological division of American minor
parties includes those third party movements which have arisen
since the end of the Civil tar, — excluding, for the present, the
Progressive Psirty of 1912.(3)
(1) MoKee, National Conventions and Platforms, 117.
(2) In the campaign of 1864 the Democrats called themselves "Con-
stitutional ITnionists" but this seems to have no particular
connection with the third party of four years earlier. It
was a time of party pseudonyms, for in the same campaign the
Republicans called themselves "Rational Unionists", Cyclo-
pedia Am. Govt. Ill, 193-194 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)
(3) We have spoken here of "third party movements" rather than of
third parties", because our principal concern in viewing the
period since the Civil War is to take note of those political
manifestations which seem to have soma simils-rity to or
bearing upon, the Progressive Party of 1912. From this stand-
point, the Mugwumps and Grangers, though technically never
organized as real third parties, are of more interest than
the "Straight Democrats" of 1872 and the Gold Democrats of
1896, who would strictly have to be classified as real minor
parties, but whom we have omitted to consider because they
seem to bear little or no close relation to the Progressives.

7Any olaesif ication of these modern American third parties is apt
to be more or less arbitrary and unsatisfactory. (1) From our
standpoint of interest in the Progressive Party, we may classify
them as (I) Precursors of the Insurgents — rebels against the
dominant faction in the Republican Party; (II) Agrarian-Currency
Dissenters; and (III) Social Reformers.
The Liberal Republicans were the earliest and most import-
ant precursors of the modern Republican Insurgents. "The Liberal
Republicans of 1872 were organized as a protest against corruption
in the administration of the National Government, and to secure
civil-service reform and tariff-reform on free-trade lines
The Liberal Republicans, therefore, stood for 'reform* and 'any-
thing to beat Grant'? (2) The Liberal Republicans seem to have
been largely a party of leaders, (3) and their nomination of Horace
Greeley for President, though accepted by the Democrats, brought
the movement to ignominious failure.
The "Stalwarts* and "HaIf-Breeds" of Hayes's time were
merely two wings of the Republican Party (4) , but twelve years
after the Liberal Republicans came a second serious revolt against
(1) Beard^e classification of these parties (Beard, American
Government and Politics- 119) wholly ignores the Liberal Re-
publicans, to say nothing of the later Mugwumps; and Macy's
classification (Cyclopedia of Am. Govt. Ill, 533-634 "Third
Parties") is likely to impress one as being based upon some-
what artificial distinctions and unnatural divisions.
(3) Woodburn — Political Parties and Party Problems in the United
States 214-315.
(3) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. 111,196 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)
(4) ibid. 196-197.

8the Party. In 1884 the name "Mugmimpe" was applied to that faction
of the Republican Party which opposed the nomination of Blaine for
President. The Mugwumps revived the idealistic attitudes or •re-
form • tradition of the Liberal Republicans; they advocated civil-
service reform, and opposed Blaine as representing policies and
practices inimical to the beet interests of the nation. The Mug-
wumps, however, never formed a third party; when Blaine finally
received the Republican nomination, some of them accepted him as
the regular candidate of their party, (1) while the rest bolted to
the Democrats and supported Cleveland, or else compromised by cast-
ing their ballots for the Prohibitionist, St. John (2)
It is interesting, then, to note that there were at least
two important early revolts against the Republican "machine", each
based upon opposition to alleged corruption in the Republican Party
In a true sense, the Liberal Republicans of 1873 and the Mugwumps
of 1884 were "precursors of the Insurgents."
Among the "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters" we may mention,
as of chief importance, the Grangers, the Greenbackers, and the
Populists. The Grangers never formed a real third party. The
Granger movement, based upon the activities of the secret and pro-
(1) This number included Theodore Roosevelt, then a young "Mug-
wump" delegate to the Republican Convention.
(2) On the Mugwumps, see Woodbum, Political Parties 216-217;
Stanwood, Presidency 432-433, 446; Cyclopedia Arc. Govt. II
475-474 "Mugwumps" (T.N. Hoover).

9feesedly non -partisan organization known as the Patrons of Husband-
ry, was a movement for agrarian organization, railroad regulation,
and political independence, (1) Politically, the Granger movement
found expression in various local independent parties, during the
years 1873-1876 (3), after which time the agrarian agitation flowed
over into new channels.
"In a few instamces. , . . . it is possible to treioe a direct
connection between the Independent parties of the Granger period
and the Greenback party, but the main issues of the Independent
parties were 'reform' and railroad regulation, while the Greenback-
ers demanded »reform» and fiat money." (3) The Greenbackers exist-
ed as a national party from 1876 through 1884, and their name has
identified them primarily with the agitation for the expansion of
the currency, and especially for the issue of fiat money.
The People's cr Populist Party, of 1892-1908, seems to
have been made up of both Grangers and Greenbackers, with the add-
ition of an important labor element. (4)
(1) Buck, Solon Justus- Granger Movement 308.
(3) ibid. 80-102: also, jack, "Independent Parties in the Western
States, 1873-1876", in Turner Essays in American History
137-164.
(3) Bick, Granger Movement 308-309.
(4) Buck, Granger Movement 309.
Frank L. McVey, "The Populist Movement", in American Economic
Association, Economic Studies I, 147-160 (August, 1896).
Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 757 "Populist Party" (O.C. Hormel.)
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Various political labor movements were cloeely connected with the
agrarian-currency parties of diesent. The Greenbackers had been
foreshadowed by the Labor Reform Party of 1873, and in 1888 the
Union Labor Party served (so far as its platform was concerned) as
a transition from Greenbackism to Populism,
^i) It is probable
that many of these Union Laborities entered the People's Party, and
that it was their adherence which gave to the Populists, in addit-
ion to their agrarian character, an interest in the laborer so
marked as to raise the question, "Is the People's Party Socialistic 7"
(3).
The radical leaven of Populism soon spread beyord the
bounds of the People's Party, "Tillman Democracy" captured South
Carolina; and a group of radical Democrats, led by such men as Bland,
Altgeld, Bryan, Blackburn, and Turpie set to work to swing the Dem-
ocratic Party from the policies of the Cleveland alministration to
an advocacy of the free and unlimited coinage of silver.
The year 1896 is one of the great land marks in the
history of American politics. The Democratic Convention assembled
with two-thirds of its delegates friendly to Free Silver. A radi-
cal platform, embodying free silver, was proposed; and William
Jennings Bryan, in one of the most remarkable political orations
(1) cf. McKee, National Conventions and platforms, 153-166;
248-251. . .
(2) McVey, op. cit. 176-184,
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•rar heard in an American convention, carried the platform, atarcped
ed the delegates, and brought to himself the leadership of the
Free Silver crusade which he proclaimed, Mr. Bryan of course did
not invent Free Silver as a political issue, nor was he the first
to introduce it into the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the
"Gross of Gold* speech is significant as marking a dramatic precip-
itation of Populism into dominant, major-party Democracy,
The Populists nominated Mr. Bryan as their candidate,
and they accepted his characterization of Free Silver as the "para-
mount issue" of the campaign. (1) The astute political generalship
of Mfiurk Hanna defeated Mr. Bryan and Free Silver in 1896, and con-
firmed the defeat four years later, in 1900. The "Middle-of-the-
Road" Populists, never friendly to fusion, regained control of the
People^e Party in 1904 (2). But the day of Populism as a paxty
was spent; and although, in 1908, the Populists solemnly affirmed
"that never again will the party, by the siren songs and false
promises of designing politicians, be tempted to change its course
or again drawn on the treacherous rooks of fusion," the announce-
ment of this belated resolution proved to be the swan-song of the
Populist Party.
(1) McKee, National Conventions and Platforms 310*
(3) Stanwood, Presidency, 1897-1909 114.
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It la important, however ^ that we should note how agrarian-currency
dissent culminated in the Populist Movement — an agrarian-currency
-
labor third party which lasted through five presidential campaigns,
and whose radical program was largely adopted, in at least one
campaign, by one of the major parties.
Our classification of Grangers, Greenbackers, and. Populidtfr
as "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters" leaves to the Socialists and
Prohibitionists the title of "Social Reformers". Perhaps a word
needs to be or to explain this classification.
The Grangers, Greenbackers , and Populists are certainly
entitled to their name of "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters", for their
platforms express the most vigorous dissent from the existing
currency system and from other economic conditions which fostered
(so they declared) irresponsible monopolies, and oppressed with
intolerable burdens the "plain people" who toiled on the farms. (1)
As we have already intimated, the presence of a large
labor element in the People »s Party gave Populism and Socialism
many points of contact. Nevertheless, the Populists were primarily
Dissenters, while the Socialists were primarily Reformers. Popul-
ism, like the Granger Movement and Greenbackism, was essentially a
(1) cf. the platforms of these Agrarian-Currency parties. The
Grangers' curious "Farmers* Declaration of Independence"
will be found in the Prairie Farmer 44: 317 (July 13,1873)
McKee, National Conventions and Platforms, contains all the
Greenback platforms, and the Populist platforms of 1892-1904.




iBovement of protest against existing economic conditions; it was
primarily negative and destructive. The Agrarian-Currency parties
seemed never to be quite certain of their ultimate aim. They were
anxious to tear down much that existed, and to try out some more
or less disconnected political experiments; but the ever-changing
program presented by their platforms seems never to have been
based upon any constructive political, social, or economic philo-
sophy, or system of thinking.
Socialism, on the other hand, has been not so much a
movement of protest as a movement of reconstruction. The Social-
ist platforms present a positive philosophy; the Socialist desires
to tear down the present economic and social fabric, but only to
clear the ground, that he may re-form and reconstruct society upon
the basis of his economic and social philosophy.
The Prohibitionists are "Social Reformers" of another kind
They have no objection to the general social organism as now con-
stituted; but they believe that society would be immeasurably bene-
fitted by the adoption of one definite, specific policy the
suppression of the liquor traffic. The issue is moral, and moral-
ity is itself a product of social evolution; so that the policy
urged by the Prohibitionists is, in reality offered as a social re-
form.
For these reasons, then, we classify the Grangers, Green-
backers, and Populists as "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters", and the
Socialists and Prohibitionists as "Social Reformers".
The American Socialist parties were foreshadowed by the
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Labor Reform Party of 1873 and the Union Labor and United Labor
parties of 1888. The Socialist Labor Party was organized in 1892;
and in 1897 the Social Democratic Party was founded by Eugene V,
Debs. In March 1900 « the greater part of the Socialist Labor men
united with the Debs Social Democrats ^ the result of this amal-
gamation being called simply the "Socialist* Party. At the time
of the union, a small faction of the Socialist Labor men refused to
join in this aimalgamation » emd continued the name and organization
of the Socialist Labor Party. At the present time, this Socialist
Labor Party "tends toward the more radical attitude of Syndicalism,
or the Industrial Workers of the World".- (1) The Socialist Party
is much the stronger of the two, having received 848 296 votes, as
against 29 073 votes for the Socialist Labor Party, in the election
of 1913. (2)
"The Prohibition party has been the longest-lived of all
third parties in this country." (3) Organized as a national party
in 1872, it has participated in every election since, though not
(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. Ill, 339 "Socialist Labor Party" (Wood-
burn)
(2) On the American Socialist parties, see Cyclopedia Am, Govt.
Ill, 326 "Social Democrats"; 338-339 "Socialist Labor Party";




(5) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. Ill, 77 "Prohibition Party" (T.N.Hoover)
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without suffering oocasionaX bolts and diviaione. In 1912 the
Prohibition candidate, Mr. Chafin , received 207 965 votes .(1)
It will be noted then, that both these parties of
social reform have been organised for a considerable number of
years, both exist at the present time, and neither shows any immed-
iate signs of rising to the position of a major party. On the
other hand, the aims of both parties have been partially realized
by the power of public sentiment, working through the agency of the
dominant major parties.
Such, then, have been the most important third parties
in American politics, from the foundation of the government in
1789 to the campaign of 1912. Such is the third-party line of des-
cent from which has sprung the Progressive Party of 1912.
To the student of Profressivism, the Republican Party
is of peculiar interest and importance. Not only was the Pro-
gressive Movement fathered in Republican ranks, but the Republican
Party, in its earlier history, presents the only example of an
American third party*s succeeding in rising to the position of a
major party, Why did the Republican Party succeed where other third
parties failed? We believe that four principal causes of the
unique and sudden success of the Republican Party may be found in
the history of the period which brought it to birth. The first
of these causes is to be found in the political setting of the
years 1854-1856. A new major party was needed.
(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. Ill, 77-78
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Sinoe the days of Andrew Jackson > Whigs and Democrats bad
contended for political supremcy in a field devoid of other serious
competitors. The Whigs "loved the Union as it was and sought sin-
cerely to uphold if.Cl) The Compromise of 1850 was the last des-
perate effort of the Whigs to preserve the status quo» But "the
Union as it was" had become "a house divided against itself" and
the eminently "conservative and respectable" (2) Party of the
Middle Period was doomed to political death by its refusal to face
the dawn of a new era, in short, the Whig Party was destroyed be-
cause it would not (or could not, on account of its geographical
composition) take an open stand on the slavery question. Without
leaders, without an issue, without the confidence of the people,
the Whigs went down in 1853 to a defeat so crushing that it necess-
arily proved fatal.
The rout of the Whigs left the country with a desperately
debatable question, but with only one debater. The Democratic
Party had assumed the defense and protection of slavery, — but who
would take up the challenge? Obviously, there were two sides to
the slavery issue; yet only one side was represented by a major
party. A new major party was needed to join the battle with the
Democrats; and the Republican Peurty was successful party because it
met this need. Stated in economic terms, there was a demand for a
new major party; the Republican Party supplied this demand, and
hence found a market.
I




But the sucoess of the Republioans was due not only to the
faot that in the loglo of events , a new major party was needed.
There was also a psyohologlcal reason for the Republican suooeee,
and this is found in the faot that the Republican Party was gener«
jBited by a spontaneous, ooromon impulae.
North of M:8on and Dixon's line, in 1854 €uid 1856, there
was a strong and growing sentiment of hostility to slavery, — a be-
lief that slavery was fundamentally wrong, and a determination that
if it could not be driven back, it should at least halt where it
was, and advance no further. The Republican Party was the or^ani2e,<|
political expression of this sentimenjtj.
The origin of the Republican Party is a phenomenon of po-
litical psychology, not an exhibit of political technology; in its
beginning, the Party was born of an unforced consensus of opinion,
not laboriously fashioned by political artificers, "As when the
seed is sown and the blades of grass spring up almost simultaneously
now here, now there, in different parts of the field, so in the
spring and summer of 1854 from the seeds of Abolition and Anti-Sla-
very Extension sprang the Republican Party in Wisconsin, Michigan,
New York, Maine, Massachusetts, Iowa, Ohio and other Northern States.'
(1) "The new party came into being from spontaneous movements in
(1) Curtis, Francis - The Republican Party, 1854-1904 i, 1-2,
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various pajta of the country* (1) and thla was the great psyoholo-
logioal oauae for the sucoess of the Republican Party.
But the suooeaa of the Republicans had a logical as well
as a psychological basis. The Republican Party waa founded upon a
clear -cut proposed so lutloa to _a vitally importsuit probleau
"It was organized for the purpose, primarily, of re-
sisting the extension of slavery." (3) The Republicans "came to-
gether from various sources, representing varied dispositions and
opinions, some radical, some conservative, some prompted by moral
motives, some by political, their only common bond and tenet of
faith being "No farther extension of slavery.'
't3) But this single
article of faith made for the suocesa of the Republicans, It was
simple,
— too simple to be raisunderstoodi it waa an honeat, open
choice of position upon the one great question that menaced the peace
of the Union; it avoided the unpopular extreme of Abolitionism,
and expressed just that shade of hostility to slavery with which the
mass of Northern men at this time were willing to agree.
Meeting a real need, generated by a common impulse, and
based upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally important
problem, the Republican Party finally waa guided to success by the
able leadership of a group of men who brought to the Party gifts
of personality, ability, and experience such as have seldom been
laid at the feet of any new-born political movement.
(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. Ill, 190 "Republican Party* (UToodburn)




VolumoB might be — and have b«on — written to describe
the influence of one alone of the Hepublioan leaders: Abraham
Lincoln, one of the major prophets of all American history; scarcely
second to Washington himself in the estimation of succeeding gen-
erations, — transcending the bounds of party in clearness of in-
sight and breadth of sympathy, yet endowed at the same time with a
rare and masterful genius for keen, practical political generalship.
Lincoln was a host in himself; but associated with him in the Party
were Seward abd Chase and Sumner and a dozen other leaders scarcely
less eminent, to say nothing of the encouraging and potent voices
of "the teachers, the preachers, the prophets, the poets, the
philosophers, the literary guides." (1)
Without denying, then, that other causes may have con-
tributed to the same result, we may conclude that the rise of the
Republicans to the position of a major party was due, very largely
at least, to the fact that a new major party was needed; that the
Republican Party was generated by a spontaneous common impulse; that
its logical basis was to be found in a clear-cut proposed solution
to a vitally important problem; and that it was commanded by unusu-
ally able leaders.
Political facts are difficult to measure and easy to
manipulate; yet, without straining or distorting the truth, may we
aot say that just these four factors which gave the Republicans




8U00088 hav9 gonarally characterized the rise of the sucoessful
Amerioan major parties, while the absence of some or all of the
same qualities has been characteristic of the comparatively un-
euooeasful movements which never became more than third parties?
There was a clear field for two major parties at the time
when the Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats came into being. The
Federalists represented a widespread common desire for the establish-
ment and preservation of law and order; they offered a clear-cut
program for creating a strong central government, as the solution
of the problem of governing the new federal Republic; and they were
led by Washington, Hamilton, Adams, and their associates. The
Democratic Party grew out of an equally intense desire for the pre-
servation of individual liberty; they offered the governmental so-
lution of State Sovereignty and loose federal government; and they
were led by the brilliant and versatile Jefferson, and his con-
freres of the later •Virginia ciynasty."
The Whig Party fulfills throe of these conditions of
major-party success, but not the fourth; it is the one real except-
ion to the rule. The Whigs arose at a time when a new major party
was needed; Federalism was dead, and the "era of good feeling" had
given place to an era of intensely bitter and shamefully petty per-
sonal politics. A "party of opposition* was needed, and the Whigs
net this need. Undoubtedly, too, the Whigs represented the strong
conservative consensus of opinion in favor of curbing the will and
power of Andrew Jackson and of the crude, if honest, frontier
I
iemocraoy which he typified. Nor were able leaders wanting to the




What the Whig Party laokod waa a logioal baeia for
Ita exiatence. The Whiga oan hardly be aaid to have presented a
clear-cut propoaed solution to any vital problem. (1) We may
suggeat, without attempting to prove, that there may have been some
connection between the laok of this logical baaia of party eziat-
enoe and the fact that the Whigs were the least auoceaaful and
least important of all American major parties, and that they were
the only major party to make no great constructive contribtuion to
American political history, (3)
Turning now to the third parties (excluding, of course
the Republicans, whom we have already diacusaed in thia connection,
and suspending judgment on the Progressives), is it true that any
one of them fulfilled theae four oonditione, -« that it arose at a
time when a new major party was needed, that it waa generated by a
Bpontaneoua common impulae, was based upon a clear-cut proposed so-
lution to a vital problem, and was oomraandod by able leaders?
(1) It is true that the Whiga generally followed the policy of
national aid in the development of commerce and industry (e.g.internal improvements, a high protective tariff, and the
*
United States Bank); but after all, the Whig movement, aa its
name indicates, was primarily a revolt against the personality
and personal leadership of Andrew Jackson; that is, thepsychological element of a spontaneous common impulse, (oppo-
sition to Jaokaon) overshadowed, if it did not exclude, thelogioal element of a clear-out logical issue.
2) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. Ill, 685 "Whig Party* (Schouler)
Croly, - Promise of American Life 67.
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The Anti-Masons and Know-Nothings rose at periods when a
new major party was more or less neaded; but neither of them grew
out of any great spontsineous impulse, and both were without im-
portant leaders; moreover, their proposals, though clear enough,
have impressed most people as being feuitastio rather than vital.
All of the other third parties, both before and after the
Civil War, oame into being when there were already two well-es-
tablished major parties; and while these dominant paurties may have
needed reformation, yet the need for a new party was, to say the
least, not self-evident.
The Abolitionists of 1840 arose before the slavery con-
troversy had gone far enough to create amy considerable common
impulse against slavery, and before the issue of abolition was
recognized as vital; also, the Abolitionists, as a political party ,
wanted great leaders.
Nor did the Liberty Party of 1844 represent any great
consensus of opinion; besides, the Liberty men clouded their issues
(1) and they also lacked able leadership.
The Free Soilers had the same clear-cut proposed solution
to the slavery problem as was later enunciated by the Republicans;
and they enjoyed the eminent, if doubtfully appropriate, leadership
of Martin Van Buren. But even in 1848 the slavery question had not
(1) See footnote, page 3,
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produced a clear consensus of opinion in the minds of Northern men.
It was only after the Kansas-Nebraska Bill terminated the "business
truce" and heralded the opening of the final phase of the slavery
struggle that the thinking of the North orystalised, as it were,
about the doctrine re-announced by the new Republican Party.
The Constitutional Union Party is the example, par ex^
oellence, of the absence of the four qualities which we have mention-
ed; it arose when no new party was needed; it was born of no great
common Impulse; it offered no solution to any problem, vital op
otherwise; ajid it possessed no leaders of first importance.
The case is not otherwise with the parties which arose
after the Civil War.
The Liberal Republicans and the Sftigwumps raised a clear
issue of governmental reform, and they did not want for leaders; but
they represented no great spontaneous, common impulse.*
The Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists reflected general
Bconomic unrest rather than any definite common impulse or con-
sensus of opinion; each of them presented a scattered series of eco-
nomic aind social measures, rather than any one clear-cut proposed
solution of a vital problem; and none of them was particularly for-
tunate in its leadership.
The Socialists have presented a fairly clear and well-de-
[fined proposed solution of the problem (vital enough, to be sure) of
the distribution of wealth; but they seem to represent no widespread
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The Prohibtioniats, finally, have offered a clear-cut
proposed solution to the liquor problem (though this problem is
one which most people seem not to consider of absolutely vital im-
portanoe), but they represent a relatively restricted and unim-
portfimt consensus of opinion; and they, too, have been without ex-
traordinarily gifted or able leaders.
From these considerations, it would appear that, in
general, these four qualities — the rise at a time when a new major
party is needed, the generation from a spontaneous, common impulse,
the presentation of a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally im-
portemt problem, and the leadership of able men — have all been
essential to the rise of an American political movement to the po-
sition of a major party; while the lack of any of these qualities
has meant failure to become more than a third party.
A priori > then (and aside from other unique and im-
portant factors which must be considered), if we find the Progressive
Party of 1913 possessing these four qualities, it will be an argu-
ment in favor of the probable success of the Progressives in attain-
ing the position of a major party; whereas the lack of any of theae
qualities will constitute a presumption in favor of their inability
to become anything greater them a third party.
In the light of this review of its third-party prede-
j
oessors, what shall be said of the Progressive Party of 1912? Which
i
j
one of its third-party ancestors does it most resemble? Is it a
t'
transient party of protest, like the Anti -Masons or Know-Nothings?
Is it a deep-rooted movement destined to supplant the Republicans
fas the Republicans themselves supplanted the Whigs. Is it but an-
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othar temporary bolt from Republicanism, fated to go the way of
the Liberal Republioans and the Mugwumps 7 Is it smother inco*
harent sxprossion of Prague eoonomio unrest? Is it a new party of
sooial reform, but doomed to linger on, with the Socialists and
Prohibitionists, in third-party impotence?
Or, on the other hand, is it true that the Progressive
Party is not a re-incarnation of any former movement, or an example
of political atavism, but that it is essentially new phenomenon
in American politics, produced by unprecedented conditions, and
pregnant with significance for the future?
The answering of these questions involves a somewhat
careful study of the development of this most striking American
political movement of recent years, and of the causes and tendencies
which produced it.
In attempting a study of the Progressive Party, we shall
have occasion to eKamine the background of Progressivism; the be-
ginnings of Progressivism; the fight for the Republican nomination
of 1913; the formation of the Progressive Party; the Progressive
Platform; the election campaign of 1912; and the later history of
the Progressive Party. The following pages, then, present an
attempt to estimate amd interpret, with as little partiality and
prejudice as may be, the available evidence concerning the causes,





THE BACKGROUND OF PROGRESSIViai
.
American history is a great drama of human progress. Upon
the first two acts of this drama, the curtain has fallen. The
third act is still in progress; how near it is to completion,
what will be its outcome, how many acts are to follow, - all
these are profound mj'-steries which only time can disclose.
The first act, or period of American liistory may be said
to begin with the discovery of the New ^'^orld by Columbus, and
to end with the political separation of the English colonies
from the l^Tother Country. In the progress of this period, dis-
covery gives way to exploration, and exploration is succeeded by
colonization; foot by foot, the wilderness is beaten back, and
the frontier retreats farther and farther v;estward, away from the
shores of the Atlantic. Fany and varied are the events of these
first decades of American history; yet never for a mement can we
fail to see their central theme. The great overshadowing fact
of the first period of American history is the physical Conquest
of the ^^ilderness ,— the clearing of the ground for the white
man's civilization, and the laying of those material foundations
upon which is to rest the whole subsequent superstructure of Amer-
ican society.
The second period of American history m.ay be said to begin
with the Revolution, and to end with the com.pletion of the Civil
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V/ar and Reconstruction. The motif of t}ie first period is still
apparent in the second: nev; commonwealths are tarved out of the
^7est; the frontier crosses tlie Rockies, and halts at last only on
tlie shores of t}ie Pacific; a policy of "Internal Improvements**
opens inaccessible regions and binds distant communities in close
relationshdps . But for all this, the Conquest of the •''ilderness
is no longer the dominant note of American history. As the
great all-compelling movement of the first period was physical,
so that of the second is psychical; for the theme of this second
period of American history is the Development of a National Con-
sciousness among the people of the nevv Republic. (1)
The seeds of Anerican nationality were strewn through colo-
nial daj'-s in those inalterable geographic conditions which made
the citizen and the society of the New V7orlds distinct and differ-
ent from those of the Old. (2) The French and Indian "'ars in-
sured the domination of the Anglo-Saxon in America, and at the
sam.e time removed the last colonial need for British protection, (3)
The Revolution gave the colonists political independence; the Ar-
ticles of Confederation recognized the desirability of a policy
of mutual co-operation among the States; the Constitution amalga-
mated the thirteen states and their possessions into one federal
Republic
.
(1) Usher, Roland G. - Rise of the American People 5-10, 340,
343-344, 365.




Still, the Americans were not, in any true sense, a nation;
secession was threatened in New England, nullification attempted
in South Carolina, and the doctrine of State Sovereignty became
the cherished corner-stone of the dominant political creed of the
South. A few leaders, here and there, dreamed of a united na-
tion and a single American people; but their dream had never been
translated into fact. At length, Webster, in his "Reply to Hayne"
,
communicated this vision to the North; (1) Lincoln led the North
to the realization of the vision, thirty years later. The North-
ern victory in the Civil "far decided that North and South should
settle their problems together ; it determined the acceptance of the
Northern view of union and nationality, ".'ith the passing of Re-
construction, and the restoration of the Southern States to their
"natural, normal relationship to the Union", the great psychical
process of the development of a iiational consciousness was essen-
tially complete, — the American Nation was born, and the American
People, united by the spiritual bond of nationality, faced what
might befall in the third period of American histoDy.
So this third period of Am.erican history begins with the
close of Reconstruction, and is still in progress. Is it possible
yet to distinguish its trend? The task is difficult, for the ac-
tors are the men of the last generation and their sons, our own
contemporaries; and the familiar tricks and gestures of well-known
personalities are likely to divert our attention fromi the underly-
(1) Usher, Rise of the American People 225-227
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ing significance of wliat is being done.
Nevertlieless , we beliRve tliat one may distinguish in contempo-
rary American history many signs which point to a new theme, seem-
ingly destined to be the central fact of the third period of Ameri-
can iiistory*
This theme of the third period is not the physical Conquest of
the "'ilderness which dominated the first period of our history.
This physical conquest still goes on, though the old rough clearing
away of the 'Vilderness has yielded to the more intensive exploita-
tion of the material resources of the Continent, by economic units
of increased size and power. But though the development of "big
business" may be tlie m.ost striking feature of recent economic his-
tory, yet it is not, we believe, the most important fact of contem-
porary American political history.
And if the theme of the third period is not the physical con-
quest of the Wilderness , neither is it the psych.ical development
of a national consciousness which dominated the second period. Not
that the spirit of American nationality has been quiescent since
Reconstruction; on the contrary, the Spanish '"'ar, the acquisition
of the island dependencies, and the emergence of "the United States
as a 7orld Power" (1) have emphasized and called for a larger re-
statement of the meaning of American nationality. But after all,
i
' these events are far from forming the general tendency or the most
(1) Coolidge, Archibald Gary - United States as a 7orld Power v
' r
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tipportant facts of the last roiir decades of American political
history.
Another tendency, we believe, is increasingly revealing itself
as the underlying tlieme and the central fact of the tJiird period of
American history. This new tendency is not primarily physical, nor
psychical; it is fundar.entally and essentially social
,
dealing
with the relations of man to nan, for it is the tendency toward
the Attainrrent of Practical Democracy .
This is not a cant phrase nor a pretty ideal; it is an actual
tendency whose reality we believe will be attested by a dispassion-
ate examination of the facts of American history of the period
since Reconstruction.
"Practical Democracy" , in the political sense in which we use
the phrase, means the possession of the supreme power by the whole
body of citizens; that is, the possession by the whole body of cit-
izens of the power actually to control and direct the government,
either through elected representatives or by other methods. This
concept of the real rule of the people implies also tlie securing
of social and industrial justice, and the blotting out of whatever
artificial inequalities unfairly restrict opportunity and prevent
certain groups from being fitted for or from exercising an effect-
ive part in democratic government.
Let us examine, for a moment, the present condition of "democ-
ERcy** in America.
The leveling conditions of the Wilderness early lent a demo-
cratic tinge to American development. Yet even the devolution and
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the founding of tlie new Republic did not secure actual and practi-
cal democracy. One great figure of the early Republic stands forth
as an unmistakable believer in '^ncl advocate of derocracv. "^y his
hand the words, "All men are created equal," wei-e v/ritten into the
"leclaration of Independence; and by the genius of his leadership
the "Democratic-Republican" Party aroae to pov/er.
T^ut the victory of Jeffersonian theories did not usher in a
milleniuin of practical dem.ocracy. Not until the era of Jackaonian
Democracy did even manhood suffrage for whites become the rule; and
a bloody Civil "'ar v/as necessary to establish tlie theory (and it
is still largely a theory) that a black skin is not necessarily a
disqualification from citizenship.
Since the ::ivil '7ar and the passing of slavery, theoretical
democracy has been practically unquestioned as the guiding princi-
nlG of American government. Mo one is bold enough -openly to deny
that the whole body of citizens should actually control and direct
tie government ; no one is eager to controvert the theory of Popu-
lar Sovereignty.
But as a matter of actual fact, it is perfectly obvious that
the whole body of citizens has not in practice directed and con-
trolled the government of the United States since the Civil ^'•ar.
Some 2'4r 000 000 women are citizens of the United States: (1) but
(1) Abstract of the Thirteenth Census, 1910 118
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only thirty-two states allowe even a limited franchise to femalec^
(1) ^t not even the whole body of male citizens direct and control
the government, ?3fightly or wrongly, necessarily or annecessarily,
the negroes of the South are largely excluded in practise from the
power to vote and to govern.
But we may carry the matter still further. Even according
to the conventional tacit definition of "the people" as the body
of white male voters, practical democracy does not obtain in the
United States; for even this whole body of wnite, male citizens
does not actually control and direct the government. A mass of
evidence supports the truth of this statement. The ruling power
of the "boss" the "rirog" and the machine id fully recorxgnized by
every student of American politics. (2) Added to this is the
corrupt liason between "big business and politics" (3) . Together
these two phenomena - first the complicated system of party or-
ganization, with a#s long ballot, tiers of convention^, and other
alliance
devices of "hide and seek politics," and second, the corru^^tinp-^
(1) Eleven states have equal suffrage for men and women, while
twenty-one other states have granted a limited franchise to
women. World Almanac 1916, 710.
(2) Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System, especially pp. 77-
85, £25-281. i3ryce, American Commonwealth II. 3-246 .V/oodburn.
Political Parties 359-377. Hay, Introduction to Political
Parties.
(3) Brooks, Hobt, C. - Corruption in American Politics and Life
161-209. Stefiens, L. - Shame of the Cities, passim. Ben 3.




between buBineaa and politics — produce the result that while the
electorate goes through the motions of voting, yet during much of
the time, if not most of the time, the whole body of white male
citizens (to say nothing of the whole body of citizens, in the
broadest sense) does not actually control and direct the government .
(1)
As we have already said, we believe that the marked polit-
ical tendency apparent in American history since Reconstruction is
the tendency toward the attainment of practical democracy. Let us
examine our grounds for this belief.
In the first place, every third-party movement, from 1865
to 1913, with the single possible exception of the Prohibition
Movement (3) has definitely tended in the direction of a fuller
measure of practical democracy.
The Liberal Republicans aimed at the stronghold of machine
politics when they attacked the spoils system and proposed a merit"
aystem of civil service. Both the Liberal Republicans and the Mug-
wumps protested vigorously against the subversion of practical
democracy by the corruption of political leaders in alliance with
business corporations.
The Agrarian- Currency Diesenters (Grangers, Greenbackers,
md Populists) were above all things concerned with the reduction
1,1) Of. White, W.A. - The Old Order Changeth pp. 10-30, for a
1 summary of much of the material contained in the works al-
ready noted. For a view of Mark Banna different from that of
I
White, cf. Herbert Croly, Mark Haima.
;3) Even here, of, DeWitt, Progressive Movement 100-109.




of the power of "trasta" and railroads, and the corresponding in-
crease of the power of the farmers and other "plain people" (1)
That the Socialists too, aim at a fuller measure of
practical democracy — involving, among other things, the common
ownership of the agencies of production — is a sufficiently clear
and well-known fact.
It is not very surprising that these movements toward
the attainment of practical democracy should have found expression
in third-party movements rather than through the medium of the two
dominant parties. The Democratic and Republican parties of today
were shaped in the struggle for nationality. They are archaic
survivals of the second period of American history; they represent
a division of men upon an issue that has been unmistakably decided
and is no longer a true subject for political wgurfare. With the
end of Reconstruction, the battle over nationality was ended, so
from 1876 to 1896, there was no great continuing clear-cut division
between Democrats and Republicsms over any important question of
policy. (3). The nearest approach to such a question was the tariff,
yet a close emalysis of the platforms and performances of the
parties from 1876 to 1896 shows no clear alignment at all on the
tariff (3) The new issues, raised by the cry for a fuller measure
(1) Of. "Farmers Declaration of Independence", Prairie Farmer,
V 44; 317 (July 13, 1873); also Greenback and Populist plat-
forms in McKee, Ifeitional Conventions and Plat\forms.




of actual democraoy, found organized expraasion in third-party
movements, and it waa only in 1896 that the spirit of Populism was
dramatically precipitated into the Democratic Party,and the old
major parties were forced into a new alignment, on live issues in-
volving judgment of the methods which the Agrarian Currency Dissent-
ers proposed as necessary to the attainment of practical democracy.
(1)
But the third-party movements of the last half century
are not the only evidences jf the modern tendency toward the at-
tainment of practical democracy. Especially during the last two
decf des marked results have been achieved in many states and cities
by local "reform" leaders, such as Governors Pingree of Michigan,
Cummins cf Iowa, Hughes of New York, Hiram f. Johnson of California
Folk of Missouri, John Johnson of Minnesota, Mayor Tom L. Johnson
of Cleveland, and others.
(1) It was through no desire of the orthodox leaders of the major
parties that the campaignof 1896 was fought over the tenets
of Populism. Only with the utmost difficulty was MoKinley per-
suaded to commit himself to a single Gtold Standard (Croly
Mark Hanna 192-304, quoted also in Beard, Contemporary
History 167); while the victory of the Frse Silver forces in
the Democratic Convention involved a sharp break witu theCleveland conservative administration Democrats. It should be
noted also that the old parties were so used to their tradit-ional division over dead or momentary issues, that this forced
re-alignment on vital questions resulted in actual secessionsfrom both parties (the bolts of the Gold Democrats and Sil-
ver Republicans,) showing how far the major parties were from




Beyond theee leaders whose work has been more or leas
local, the eame tendency to push on towards the attainment of
practical democracy may be seen in a number of the most eminent
national political leaders of recent years. Beneath all their per-
sonal and party differences, such men as Bryan, Roosevelt, Wilson
and LaFDllette possess this common element of devotion to the cause
of practical democracy. Bryan »s campaign cry of 1908, "Shall the
people rule?" is typical of his consistent labors for the protection
and welfare of "the producing masses," "the laboring interests",
and "the people", as distinguished from the wealthy or socalled
privileged" classes.
Roosevelt's tremendous popularity with millions of his
fellow citizens, during his presidency, was the reflex of his own
sturdy confidence in American democracy and in the average manv(l)
LaFollette's political utterances, and indeed his whole political
career has been characterized by an almost passionate devotion to
the "cause" of practical democracy
. (2) And in the carefully wrought
addresses of Wilson there breathes the same spirit of faith in the
Eidvance of practical democracy. (5)
(1) Rev. Revs, v 29:30 (Jan. 1904); 30: 643 (Dec. 1904);
34: 402 (Oct. 1906) Cf, also Roosevelt's own statements in
his autobiography, 34, 420, 501, 519 etc.
(3) LaFollette's Autobiography, 24,63, 304,352, 369, 475,
521, 759, etc.




Occasionally, there is open recognition of the common
ground possessed by such natiOLal leaders. La Pollette recalls how
Bryan once came to his aid in a V/isconsin campaign, v/ith a warm
speech of support. (1) An editorial writer not unfriendly to
Roosevelt declares that " If ilr. Roosevelt had lived in llebraska
.
... or .... continued in the ranching business on the Little Lliss-
ouri, there is a very fair chance that he v.ould have stood shoulder
to shoulder with Lir
.
Bryan in the fight for free silver." (2) And
Bryan himself
,
as he Journeyed in 191E from the birth of the Pro-
gressive Party in Chicago to the Democratic Convention in Baltimore,
wrote: " I saw a lot of brave men at Chicago, fighting for the
people. V/e have a lot of brave men here fighting on the same side.
Hay their tribe increase " (3)
SO among many of both the greater and the lesaer political
leaders of the last t¥/enty years we may trace individual participa-
tion and sometimes non-partisan union in the movement toward the
attainment of practical democracy.
As these leaders and others have met with the bitter op-
position from conservative party men and defenders of the political
status quo, there has gradually ga70wn, in the minds of many politi-
cal leaders, students, and voters, the conviction that certain new
Pract i cal
governmental methods are needed to facilitate the attainment of.
(1) j^a toilette's Autobiography, 34E-345
(2) Rev. Revs. 34:259 ( Sept. 1906 )
(3) Bryan, Tale of Tv/o Conventions 172. The italics are ours.
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democracy. There has "been much random experimentation.,, and plenty
of " wildcat" measures; hut it appears at the present time that
there is beginning to he a consensus of opinion among many politi-
cal leaders and students that certain modern proposals will he like-
ly to secure a greater degree of practical democracy. Among this
group of " reforrr.s", we believe that some form of at least the fol-
lowing measures would naturally be included;
1. The Direct Primary, by means of which the voter may
directly participate in the nomination as well as in the election
of candidates for office.
2. The Short Ballot, v/hich will enable the voter to cast
his ballot more intelligently and effectively, by concentrating his
attention upon the choice of a few important officials, leaving other
positions to be filled by other means.
3. The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, by means of
v/hich the voters may directly participate in legislation, or may
remove certain officials from office.
4. Changes in the form of municipal government (Government
by Commission, the City Manager Plan, etc.), designed not only to
promote governmental efficiency but also to make the municipal gov-
nment more responsive to the people of the city. (1)
(1) Be Witt, in The Progressive Hovement describes in detail the
above and a considerable number of other measures which he in-
cludes in " the progrest;ive movement" ii: Hation, State, and
City. V/e have mentioned here only those proposals which have
received fairly v/ide acceptance, and which v/ould seem to aid
directly in securing a fuller measure of practical democracy.
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Along with the increasing adoption of these governmental
methods has come the rise of a new group of more or less popular
writers,- some of them men of much originality and force of thought,
-
such as Oroly, (1) Weyl, (2) W. A. White, (3) Cleveland, (4) Ben B.
Lindsey, (6) and others, who have striven tu interpret the changing
conditions of American political and social life, in terms that
express or imply a faith in the gradual attainment of practical dem-
ocracy.
jj'inally, the steady advance of the cause of l7oman Suffrage
bears striking testimony to the tendency toward the attainment of
practical democracy. The "Woman's Rights Party" of 1884 and 1888 was
not an or^ranization that mo&i people took seriously; yet in the
year 1916 women exercise full voting power in eleven states and they
possess a limited franchise in twenty-one other states. (6) jj'urther-
more, in the national election of ,1912, the platforms




(3) Y/hite, Old Order Gnangeth
(4) Cleveland, Organized Democracy
lb) Lindsey, i'he Beast. Lindsey's book is a reprint of series of
articles contributed to a popular magazine, and is less ex-
pository and scholarly than the other books mentioned; but it
is a serious attempt to advance the cause of practical dem-
ocracy by arousing the people to the iniquities practiced by
"big business" in politics.
(6) V/orld Almanac, 1916 710
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of the Trogres^ive, (1) Socialist, (2) and Prohibition (5) parties
contained equal- suffrage planlcs; and at the present tiiTje, a number
of the most prominent opposing leaders in American politics - among
them, President Vvilson, (4) ex-President Roosevelt, (6) Col, Bryan,
(6) and Senator La i^'ollette (7) have all declared in favor of V/oman
Suffrage
.
Whether one believes that V/oman Sufxrage is desirable or
undesirable, one cannot fail to recognize that it is a step in the
direction of the actual control of the government by a number that
more nearly approximates the whole body of citizens; for V/oman
Suffrage means the extension of the right to vote to the millions
of citizens previously disfranchised solely on account of sex, (8)
The advance of V/oman Suffrage, then, is another evidence of the
(1) Stanwood, Presidency, 1879-1909 282
(2) ibid 256
(3) ibid 280
(4) St. Louis Globe-Democrat Sept, 9, 1916, p,l
(5) Roosevelt, Autobiography 177-130
(6) Literary Digest v 49:175-177 (Aug.l, 1914 )
(7) La jj^ollette, Autobiography S17-318
(8) cf. Beveridge, Progressive- Republican Merger 14. "The second
principle on which the progressive Party is founded is a broad-
er, purer Democracy _3o the Progressive Party believes
that v/oman should have the right to vote precisely the same
as men " The italics are ours .
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tendency toward practical democracy.
If space permitted, it might "be shown that all of these
political evidences- the third party moveraente since the Civil War, ,
the work of individual local and national leaders, the new govern-
mental measures, the v/ritings of the nev. political interperters,
and the advance of Woman Suffrage are, in reality, only a part of
a wider and deeper social movement in the direction of the attain-
ment of real democracy throughout the v/hole field of American life.
In economics, the distrihution rather than the production of v/ealth
with all that this holds of social significance, is coming to he
recongnized as the supremely important problem; (1) and Socialism
is treated with respectful consideration "by reputable economists.
In religion, writers like Rauschenbusch, (2) Peabody, (3) Strayer
(4) and Mathews (5) are interpreting Christianity in social terms.
Within the church and without, workers engaged in "social service"
are laying great emphasis on the application of the principle of
human brotherhood, with its implicatinn of equal opportunity.
]?inally, these new social beliefs and habits of thinking are being
(1) Hayes, Introduction to the Study of Sociology 4,95-139, and
passim
(2) Hauschenbusch, Walter- Christianity and the Social Crisis;
Christianizing the Social Order.
(3) Peabody, Francis G-, -Jesus Christ and the Social Question
(4) Strayer, Paul H.- ..ie construction of the Church
(5) Mathews, Shailer- Social Teaching of Jesus
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popularized by innumerable v/riters on social subjects, both within
and without the popular magazines, and in some cases by the more
serious writers of fiction. (1) So the political tendency toward the
attainment of practical democracy is reflected in religious, economic
and other social fields of life.
The Progressive Party of 1912 ought not to be studied
and cannot be properly understood apart from the background which we
have been attempting to describe. Benjamin P. De V;itt has written of
a " progressive movement" which is " broader than the Progressive
Party and, in fact, than any single party. It is the embodiment and
expression of fundamental measures and principles of reform that
have been advocated for many years by all political parties." (2)
V.'hatever terms may be employed, the fact is certain: the Progressive
rarty of 1912 is merely one integral part of a much broader movement.
This broader movement v/e have described as the theme of American
history since Reconstructicin: the social tendency toward the attain-
(1) It is very interesting to note that in 1913 the "best-seller"
arnong American novels v/as V/inston Churchill's The Inside of
the Cup, a book whica distinctly attempts to interpret certain
phases of the religious-sccial- economic situation of to-day,
and in which t'he author makes the somewhat startlir^g assertion
that the Cause jf modern Christianity is Democracy, (pp 361,
363,366,370.) Jhe marked success of this book argues a
decided interest in these questions and these views on tnebpart
of the American reading public.
(2) De Witt, Progressive x^ovement vii
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ment of practical democracy. '.Ve shall, in general, use the terms
"Progressive Movement 'Progres sivisra, " and " Progressive" to refer
only to the Progrest:ive Party of 1912; "but v/e shall bear in mind,
as we study the life of this Party, that it is one part of the
movement toward practical democracy . With this "background in mind,
we shall be in a position to approach intelligently the study of




THE BEGINNINGS OP PROGRESSIVISM
"When one enters on the search for the fountainhead of a
great movement, one risks being tempted to go baok and back until
one reaches absurdity in the Garden of Eden." (1) Waiving the
question as to whether Progressivism conforms to the requirements
of a "great movement." we may accept Professor Van Tyne»s dictum
as a working maxim; and, conquering the temptation to search for
the seeds of the movement in earlier generations, we may begin
our study of the beginnings of Progressivism with the beginning
of the first presidency of the man who was to become the founder,
leadBr, and nominee of the Progressive Party of 1912.
When an anarchist's bullet put an end to the life of Pres-
ident McZinley, and when Theodore Roosevelt took the oath of of-
fice as President of the United States, on September 14, 1901, a
new personality assumed a commanding position in American politics.
Theodore Roosevelt.
It would be futile to attempt a study of the Progressive Party
of 1912 without making a serious effort to understand the character
of Theodore Roosevelt. Not only is the history of the Party itself
inseparably connected with his personality; but during eight of the




twelve years preceding the founding of the Party, he was the Chief
Executive of the nation and the most important and conspicuous fig-
ure in American public life.
The difficulty of attempting such an estimate of a contempora-
ry leader is well recognized. He stands so close to us that it is
difficult to secure the proper perspective. (1) Then, too, the ev-
idence is not all in. Every new day of the man's life adds new ma-
terial for the formation of a judgment regarding his character;
and the actions of a single day may he so important and revealing
as to upset all previous conclusions. The best that we can do,
then, is to try to approach the evidence at hand with the impartial
attitude of a student of contemporary politics; to seelc to avoid
both partisanship and prejudice, and to blend appreciation and crit-
icism in their just proportions.
When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901, at the age
of forty-three, he had already attained to a broader and more varied
experience than comes to many a man in a lifetime. From the first
he WQS peculiarly fortunate in freedom from any tendency toward sec-
tionalism or provincialism, and in the opportunity to know and sym-
pathize with every great section of the country. Born in 1858 of a
New York father, the descendsmt of Dutch ancestors, and of an "un-
reconstructed" Southern mother, Roosevelt received his university
training in the East, graduating with honors at Harvard; and this
was followed by a no less important preparation for life in the har-
dy school of the Western ranchman. Roosevelt early turned to
(1) Cf. Hallam, Constitutional History, II, 144.
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politics and public life; and he successively rendered energetic
and effective service as a member of the New York Assembly, United
States Civil Service Commissioner, President of the New York City
Police Board, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel of the cav-
alry regiment of "Rough Riders" in the Spanish-American War, and
Governor of New York. At length, in 1900, orthodox Republican pol-
iticians troubled by his increasing personal popularity and at his
boundless and occasionally disconcerting energy, attempted to
"shelve" hira politically by forcing upon him the Tice-Presidency. ( 1)
Events played havoc with their plans; six months after the election,
President McKinley was assassinated, and Theodore Roosevelt succeed-
ed to the presidency of the United States.
In spite of Roosevelt's pledge, as he took the oath of office
that it would be his "aim to continue, absolutely unbroken, the pol-
icies of President McKinley"( £) , his administration was Inevitably
the expression of his own masterful personality. He rapidly attain-
ed a tremendous personal popularity(3^ ; and in 1904 he was unen-
imously re-norainated, and overwhelmingly re-elected President for
another four years.
What sort of a man is Theodore Roosevelt? To what did he owe
his great popularity? And in what ways, if any, were his adminis-
trations connected with the events that led to the formation of the
Progressive Party in 1912?
(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 227.
(2) Rev. Revs., v 24i425 (Oct. 1901).
(3) Haworth, Reconstruction and Union, 228.
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At the very start, it is necessary to realize that Theodore
Roosevelt is a many-sided man, with wide and varied interests, ( 1)
but with none so overmastering as his interest in human nature. (2)
He is, moreover, an extremely versatile man, (3) for he has shown
ability and achieved success as a student, ranchman, military of-
ficer, author, political leader, and city, state, and national ex-
ecutive. As a writer, Roosevelt has been prolific. His presiden-
tial messages alone would doubtless fill hundreds of printed pages;
and his collected speeches and addresses would require several vol-
umes. Besides these political writings, Roosevelt has written also
biography, (4) history, (5) essays "social and political" ,( 6)
editorials and magazine articles, (7) both popular and semi-scien-
tific accounts of hunting expeditions, ( 8) and other works. (9)
(1) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 355, and passim cf. also Douglas,
Geo. Wra. - Many-sided Roosevelt, passim.
(2) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 361, 364.
(3) World's Work, v 24:129 (June, 1912).
(4) e. g* , Gouverneur Morris and Thomas Hart Benton, in the "Amer-
ican Statesmen Series."
(5) e. go. Winning the West.
(6) e. g., American Ideals and Other Essays Social and Political;
Strenuous Life.
(7) In the Outlook and elsewhere.
(8) e. go. Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter; African Game
Trails; life Histories of African Game Animals.




Another cardinal element in the character of Roosevelt is hie
tremendous store of energy. Ho has lived more fnlly and actively,
and has enjoyed a wider reach of experience than almost any other
American of his generation. He is a tremendous worker, and he has
practised, as well as preached, the doctrine of the "strenuous
life".(l)
This boundless and unceasing energy has a deepset physical
basis. Roosevelt is intensely strong euad virile. He is an athlete
and a sportsman. His own personal courage is unquestioned, and he
believes in courage ( meaning, largely, physical courage) as one of
the supremely necessary and important elements of character. (2)
This exaltation of courage joins easily and naturally with an ac-
tive, practical, matter-of-fact patriotism. Roosevelt believes in
patriotism as a present reality and necessity, and he is at least
not enthusiastic over golden visions of universal peace. (3) He be-
lieves that patriotism - the advancement of the interests of one's
own nation - is a virtue; that war is distinctly preferable to
peace in certain contingencies; and that peace can best - and only -
be secured by proper preparation and readiness to fight. (4)
In his views of foreign policy, as in his personal political
life, Roosevelt has always been aggressive, if not belligerent; and
(1) Of. Roosevelt, Strenuous Life.
(E) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 43, 46, 143; Autobiography, 377;
Rev. Revs., v 24:443 (Oct., 1901).
(3) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 20, 251, 255.
(4) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 247 ff
.




perhaps this very quality has been responsible for a good measure
of his popularity. (1) "Speak softly and carry a big stick" was one
of the sayings which Roosevelt popularized; and he has ever consist-
ently maintained that softness and gentleness will not avail, "if
back of the softness there does not lie strength, power." (2)
Along with this personal aggressiveness, Roosevelt has shown
a masterful, dominant personal leadership. He is restrained by no
squeamish canons of retiring modesty; (3) and he seems to place su-
preme self-confidence in his own Judgment, - himself against all
comers. f4)
It is true, nevertheless, that the judgment in which he trusts
is essentially personal rather than Judicial. He has no difficulty
in determining "the truth" or "the right"; he can see no side of
the question but his own; (5) he is capable of dogmatism(6) and un-
fairness in an argument, (7) and is intolerant and contemptuous of
opposition; (8) his judgments of men are inevitably colored by
(1) Hart, (Albert Bushnell -) National Ideals, 360. One can hardly
doubt that the writer of these sentences had Roosevelt in mind.
(2) Rev. Revs., v 24:443 (Oct., 19011
.
(3) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 421
(4) ibid., 583 and
(5) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 77 ff, 502; American Ideals, 5, 209,
223.
(6) American Ideals, 293, 303 ff.
(7) Autobiography, 627-628.
(8) American Ideals, 212; Autobiography, 650-551.
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personal feelings of like or dislike, (1) and he unoonsoiously exag-
gerates the importance of events which are close at hand.(E)
VThatever faults may be urged against Roosevelt, one can scarce-
ly study his career and his writings as a whole without coming to the
conclusion that Theodore Roosevelt is personally and fundamentally
genuine and sincere. (3) An unscrupulous schemer would hardly have
written, said, and done do many things that were bound to raise up
powerful opposition. Then, too, it is almost unthinkable that so
large a part of the American people could have been utterly deceived
in the character of the man whom they believed to be essentially sin-
cere. (4) Whatever may be the explanation of the phenomena connected
with the Progressive Party of 1912, it is not likely to be found in
deliberate insincerity or betrayal of faith by the founder of the
party.
Out of his own personal genuineness of life, Roosevelt has
evolved and preached a gospel of plain morality and "sound living"
which has probably had a real effect in tending to raise the level
of American life. Even his enemy LaPollette admits that "Roosevelt
is deserving of credit for his appeals made from time to time for
higher ethical standards, social decency, and civic honesty. He dis-
cussed these matters strikingly and with vigor, investing every ut-
terance with his unique personality. He would seize upon some
(1) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 298-299, 202, 303; 474.
(2) Autobiography, 513 ff.
(3) Rev. Revs., v 24:436 (Oct., 1901), v 46:303-305 (Sept., 1912).
(4) ibid., V 29:20 (Jan., 1904).
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anoient and accepted precept - as, 'Honesty is the best policy' -
and treat it with a spirit and energy that made him seem almost the
original discoverer of the truth." (1)
The implied irony of the last sentence is not wholly undeserved.
His subjects are, indeed, the "old, commonplaoe virtues"; and there
is nothing original and much that is prosy or repetitious in his
statements of the doctrines of "sound living".
The more important of these theses, which Roosevelt has indus-
triously upheld, may be summarized as follows:
1. Everybody should have a "square deal'/ - a fair chance. The will
of the whole people should not be choked by privilege ,^ior violated
by political or business corruption. ( 2) Carried to its logical con-
elusion, this is the doctrine of Practical Democracy; and it marks
Roosevelt as fundamentally in accord with the prevailing tendency of
contemporary Araerioan political history.
(3)
2. We must be loyal to ideals, but also be practical and efficient.
3. In foreign affairs, a nation should behave towards other na-
tions "precisely as a strong, honorable, and upright man behaves in
dealing with his fellow-men"
. (4)
4. In private and public life we must practice the "old, oommon-
(1) laFollette, Autobiography, 479.
(2) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 497,501; Rev. Revs., v 30:64^ (Dec,
1904);v 34:402 (Oct ., 1906) ;v 46:148 (Aug. ,1912).
(3) Roosevelt. American Ideals, 36, 54, 55; Autobiography, 310.




plaoe virtues" if we would keep sound "the oore of our national
being". (1)
6. "On the whole, we think that the greatest victories are yet to
be won, the greatest deeds yet to he done, and that there are yet
in store grander triumphs than have ever yet been scored.
But be this as it may. the one plain duty of every man
is to face the future as he faces the present, regardless of what it
may have in store for him, and, turning toward the light as he sees
the light, to play his part manfully, as a man among men."
Many who have come into intimate relations with Roosevelt have
testified to the exceptional vigor, keenness, and power of his mind.
Senator Cullom calls him "a marvellous man, a man of great re-
sources, great intellect" ; (3) LaPollette speaks of the "quickness
with which his mind grasps an important subject"; (4) and Riis men-
tions his power of complete concentration. f 6)
Nevertheless, Roosevelt has certain very distinct mental lim-
itations and tendencies, and these mental traits have played a
large part in moulding the history both of his administrations as
I
President and of the Progressive Party.
In the first place,Roosevelt » s mind is distinctly tndttettve.
He does not start out with a carefully-reasoned, logical philosophy;
he is "content to wait and see what method (may) be necessary in
(1). Rev. Revs., v 242443 (Oct., 1901), v 32:140 (Aug. ,1906).
Roosevelt, American Ideals, 43, 308, 327, 369, and passim.
(S) Roosevelt, op. cit., 302.
(3) Cullom, Fifty Years Public Service, 295.
(4) LaPollette, Autobiography, 380.
(5) Riis, Theodore Roosevelt, the Citizen, passim.

53
each given case".(l) In view of this, it is not surprising that
Roosevelt's whole attitude is essentially un-legal.(2) He is impa-
tient of complex legal theories or restraints; (3) emcL his refresh-
ingly naive attitude toward court opinions on difficult legal ques-
tions (4) are evidence that he is incapable of really entering into
the legal attitude and its conceptions.
With the distaste for legal theory there is also an "absence
of definite economic concept ion". ( 6) He has never been able to make
any very important constructive contribution to the tariff history
of his time; (6) his policies in regard to "big business" are so
vague as to be difficult of clear formulation. ( 7) He instinctively
assumes that "the prevailing system of production and distribution
of wealth (is) essentially sound"; (8) and he distrusts and combats
Socialism and Socialists, without ever deigning to attempt a serious









Roosevelt, Autobiography, 4E1, 6E. Roosevelt evidently began




laPollette, Autobiography, 478; Rev. Revs., v 43:16 (Jan. ,1911):
World»s Work, v 24:129 (June, 1912).
Rev. Revs., v 42:648-649 (Dec. ,1910).
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 442, 499, 619; Rev. Revs., v 24:442
(Oct., 1901); V 26:396 ff. (Oct.. 1902); Beard, Contemporary
History, 256 ff. *^
Beard, op. cit., 261.




Along with his inductive habits of thought, Roosevelt is su-
premely practioal in all his mental attitudes. ( 1) Believing that
" conditions must be faced as they are, ajid not as they
ought to he," he has constantly proclaimed the supremacy of con-
crete fact over abstract law or theory. (2)
This intense desire for practical efficiency and for getting
things done, as well as his lack of d^uctive political philosophy,
have led him to make compromises and to co-operate, many times,
with men of different views and even of lower political ideals. (3)
These practical compromises have at times given rise to considerable
discussion as to where Roosevelt really stands in the field of po-
litical thought. LaFollette has charged that "... It is his po-
litical habit so to state and qualify his positions that you are
never quite sure of him"; (4) and though he was widely thought of
during his terms in the presidency as an innovator and a man of pro-
gressive, if not radical, ideas, yet there is considerable testimony
to the belief that his character and administrations were really es-
sentially conservative. ( 5)
But whatever may be our judgment as to the virtues and the
faults of Roosevelt, there is one patent fact which no one can fail
(1) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 164-165.
(2) Roosevelt, op. cit., 46, 51; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 341, 503.
(3) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 120, 220; Autobiography, 340,382;
IiaFollette, Autobiography, 388.
(4) LaFollette, Autobiography, 497.
(5) Rev. Revs., v 28i521 (Nov. , 1903) ; 29:271 (March, 1904) ; 29,651




to recognize; and that is his tremendous personal popularity among
the American people. (1) What is the reason for this popularity?
The real explanation of Roosevelt's popularity lies in the
principle of Common Background; that is, the psychological fact
that other things being equal, a common background of life, memory,
and interests draws people together, and a different background re-
pels them. Roosevelt has a common background of memory and interest
with the people of every great section of the country . ( 8) The
many-sidedness of his life, abilities, and interests gives him
something in common with almost every class of Americans. "Independ-
ents liked him because they remembered his long struggle for civil
service reform and his efficient work a« police commissioner of New
York. Westerners waxed enthusiastic over him because he had made
himself one of them. Young men admired him because he had the vigor
and enthusiasm of youth. Politicians supported him because of his
ability to produce pluralities. Journalists approved of him because
he afforded them abundant 'copy*. In him millions of Americans 3aw«
or thought they saw, qualities or int erests that they themselve s
possessed. "(3) That is the crux of the whole matter: there was a
real genuine common background of life and interests between
Roosevelt and the ordinary American citizen.
(1) Haworth, Reconstruction, 211, 228; Rev. Revs., v 26,259 (Sept.,
1902); V 27:387 (April, 1903) ; v 34:261 (Sept. 1906); v 37:3
(Jan., 1908); v 39:136 (Feb., 1909)
o
(2) Of. pp. of this chapter. Also, Rev. Revs., v 24:436 (Oct.,
1901); V 24;517 (Nov. 1901).
(3) Haworth, Reconstruction, 211. The italics are ours.
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Nor has Roosevelt ever minimized, but rather rejoiced in and
exalted these essentially human interests. "At Sagamore Hill we
love a great many things - birds and trees and books, and all things
beautiful, and horses and rifles and children and hard work and the
Joy of life." (1) And again he awakens a thrill of response when
he sets humanity first with the remarks that "Books are all very
well in their way but children are better than book8"*{ 2 )and
that all men "need more than anything else to know human nature". (3)
Indeed, Roosevelt was not far wrong when he said, "I in my soul
know that I am but the average man". (4) Rightly understood, there is
no discredit in this statement. Roosevelt has started out with the
background and capabilities of the average man, but he has made
splendid use of his abilities and resources, so that he has been an
efficient leader in many fields of action, in turn. Yet he has never
lost his early faith in the common people, (5) his ability to
strive with them for a broad "true Americanism", (6) nor his power
to touch them through a common background and so to lead and in-
fluence them.
So we may leave as our tentative and incomplete impression of




(4) Harper's Monthly Magazine, 131:582 (Sept . ,1916)
.
(E) Roosevelt, Ailtobiography , 304.
(6) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 16-34; 41-42.
(?) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 366.
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the Judgment that Theodore Roosevelt is largely the Amerloan cit -
izen Intenaified»
What, then, were the contributions of Roosevelt's administra-
tions to the history of Progresslvism?
It would seem that Roosevelt was eminently fitted for just the
period in which he was called to the presidency. ( 1) The complacent
materialism of the days of Mark Hanna was already disturbed by the
great populist and free-silver movements which were "the organized
expression of men's discontent" and of their determination to bring
about a better adjustment of economic conditions. (2)
The Free Silver Movement was crushed in 1896 and 1900, but
Populism did not die. No longer important as an organized national
movement, "it began to work from the ground upward, attacking one
piece of political machinery after another and pressing upon un-
willing state legislatures new forms of agrarian legislatiorl'. (3)
So it happened that 'Mr. Rposevelt's Presidency coincided with
a period of profound economic change and agitation in America'. (4|
People were gradually becoming restless under the vaguely forming
impressions that "American business vas rotten at the core", (5)
that the great combinations of capital were sorely in need of some
sort of effective supervision, and that the traditional system of
(1) Rev. Revs., v 3E:709 (Dec. ,1905); Haworth, .Reconstruction, 213.
(2) Rev. Revs.. 36:3 (JUly. 1907)
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 283-284.
(4) Rev. Revs., v 33:651 (jUne,19Q6).
Of. also Croly, Mark Hanna, passim.
(5) Haworth, Reconstruction, 214.
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American government was actually resulting, in many ways, in some-
thing other than the rule of the people.
The work which needed to be done was admirably fitted to the
capabilities and qualifications of President Roosevelt. The time
was not yet ripe for the construction of new forms of political and
economic expression; it was necessary first to arouse the people to
the iniquity and insufficiency of the old. It was precisely this
thing that was President Roosevelt's greatest achievement: he
awakened the public conscience
.
( 1) and gave popular impetus to the
yet unorganized movement toward the attainment of practical democ-
racy. Coming into office without "any deliberately planned and far-
reaching scheme of social bett erment" , ( S) he gradually developed
a social attitude which was in reality the spirit of the new ten-
dency toward political democracy. As an average American citizen,
intensified, Roosevelt sensed the drift of his day, (3) responded to
it promptly and ably, and became a leader of the awakening public.
His most important work was that of agitation. (4^ It was his
task to furrow the ground in preparation for the sowing of later
political leaders of less popularity but of more profound economic
and political philosophy.
Briefly, then, we may thus sunmarize the contribution of
Roosevelt's administrations to the beginnings of Progressivism:
(1) Haworth, Reconstruction, 234-E35.
(3) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 420.
(3) Even his enemy, LaFollette, gives him credit (a little envious-
ly, one may guess) for this ability. laPollette, Autobiogra-
phy, 388-389.
(4) Haworth, 234-235. Cf. also Rev. Revs, v 38:132 (Aug..l9o8. )
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1. Roosevelt helped to arouse the people to the understanding
that practical democracy was not a fact in the United States, and
that much was to he done before practical democracy could be at-
tained.
In this, his task was not that of a Prophet, with clear and
far-seeing vision denied to the ordinary man; his work was rather
that of an Agent of Expression, translating into words the strug-
gling thoughts and feelings of his fellow-citizens. ( 1)
2. He exemplified and popularized the spirit of the quest for the
attainment of practical democracy.
Roosevelt's adherence to the movement for practical democracy
was emotional rather than philosophical. He felt that the movement
was right, and he threw his great personality into the struggle,
without reserve. But here his early contribution to Progressivism
ended. Roosevelt was never able clearly to formulate the underly-
ing principles or the methods necessary for the success of the
movement for practical democracy.
LaJ'ollette and Republican Insurgency.
On January 4, 1906, Robert M. LaPollette entered the United
States Senate as junior Senator from the State of Wisconsin.
LaPollette had served a twenty-five-year apprenticeship as a polit-
ical reformer in his native state; and after three terms in Con-
gress and four years as Governor, he was at length elected to the
United States Senate in 1905.(2)
rn ^Rev. Revs., 44:644/ (Dec. , 1911)
.




LaFollette was a man of extraordinary power and great abili-
ties. A university graduate and a lawyer, he was also a tireless,
resouroeful, and tremendously efficient worker, a powerful and con-
vincing speaker, a shrewd politician, and a man of unimpeachable
integrity and invincible determination. ( 1)
Prom almost his first entrance into politics, LaFollette seems
to have realized the need for a movement toward political democracy.
Of his first political contest, he says: "In refusing to acknowl-
edge the authority of Boss Keyes at the outset I was merely express-
ing a common and widespread, though largely unconscious, spirit of
revolt among the people, - a movement of the new generation toward
more democracy in human relationships. No one had thought it out in
sharply defined terras, but nearly every one felt it".(E)
As a matter of fact, LaFollette' s political position has always
depended largely upon the fact that he was one of the foremost lead-
ers in "thinking out" the new movement "in sharply defined terms".
His habits of thought were legally precise and accurate, and his at-
titude of mind v^as largely de4tt«#4*«»^,^ rational and philosophical
in the best sense of the word. He keenly analyzed the situation in
Wisconsin, and then reasoned out certain principles whose applica-
tion he believed would secure more practical democracy.
He recognized and defined the political tendency of his gener-
ation far more clearly than did his contemporary. President Roose-
velt. LaPollette possessed the faculty of seizing upon the essential
(1) Rev. Revs., 30:13-15 (July, 1904).
(8) LaPollette, Autobiography, 25. The italics are ours.
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elements. "It matters little," he writes, "whether the particular
question at issue is the tariff, the railroads, or the currency.
The fight la the same. It is not a question of party politics. The
great issue strikes down to the foundations of our free Institutions.
It is against the system built up by privilege that we
must make increasing warfare". (1) iknd again: " The supremo
issue, involving all the others, is the encroachment of the power-
ful few upon the r ight
a
of the many. There never
was a higher call to greater service than in this protracted fight
for social justice". (2) It would be hard to find a clearer and more
statesmanlike statement of the struggle and the tendency in contem-
porary American politics.
With such a personality and with such convictions, iaFollette
entered the Senate. "No sooner had he entered that body than he be-
gan to propound his doctrines there. At first, he stood alone, but
natural inclination soon drew to him such of the older Senators as
the late Jonathan P. Dolliver, of Iowa, (3) and Moses E. Clapp, of
Minnesota With the incoming of Mr. Taft as President
came also Albert B. Cummins, of Iowa, Joseph L. Bristow, of Kansas,
and Coe I. Crawford, of South Dakota, all of whom joined heartily
with Mr. LaFollette in his efforts to shape legislation. "(4)
(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 475. The italics are ours.
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 760.
(3) Cf. LaFollette, Autobiography, 428-436.
(4) Gullom, Fifty years Public Service, 420-421.
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With this group of men, augmented "by a number of later acoes-
8ion8,(l) began the Insurgent Movement In the Republican Party.
Kepublican Insurgency was the one definite polit ical movement
which ^ecific£% foreshadowed the Progressive Party of 1912.
LaFollette is right when he declares that "the Roosevelt ad-
ministration came to a close on the fourth of March, 1909, without
leaving to its credit a definite Progressive nat ional movement
(that is, a definite political movement for the attainment of prac-
tical democracy) with a clearly defined body of issues". (2)
After practically dictating the nomination and after witness-
ing the election of William Howard Taft as his successor in the
Presidency, Roosevelt sailed for Africa on March 24, 1909, return-
ing to America in June, 1910.
President Taft said at the beginning of his administration
that the function of his administration would be "distinct from
and a progressive development of" the work of his predecessor; ( 3)
but few people believed that he would make any serious departures
from the spirit or policies of President Roosevelt.
No sooner had the 61 st Congress assembled in special ses-
sion in the month of 'i'aft's inauguration, than a bitter struggle
broke out in the lower house between the regular and insurgent mem-
bers of the Republican Party.
Joseph G. Cannon, the leader of the body of "regular" Repub-
(1) Cullora, op. cit. 424. LaPollette, Autobiography, ,428.
(2) LaPollette, Autobiography, 483. The italics are ours.
See also LaPollette ' s 7/eekly, v 4^3 (June 29, 1912).





licana, was ro-eleoted Spoalcer; but an attempt was made, by an
alliance of Bemoorats and Insurgents, to abolish the greater part
of the Speaker's enormous power of oonmittee appointment, and to
depose him from his place on the Conmlttee on Rules. (1) In tho end
a compromise resolution prevailed, by means of which certain rules
were amended in the declared interests of democratizing the pro-
cedure of the House. (E)
As the session advanced, a number of Insurgents, especially
in the Senate, settled into an open course of hostility to the
Payne -Aldrich tariff program of the Republican majority, (3) and
the Insurgents succeeded in winning more and more favorable public
attehtion as the debate progressed. (4)
Again in March, 1910, the House Insurgents united with the
Democrats in a new revolt. This time, two appeals from the Speaker's
decisions were sustained by vote of the House; (5) the Committee on
Rules was made elective, and the Speaker was rendered ineligible
to a place on the Committee; (6) though a motion to declare the
Speakership vacant was lost. f 7)
(1) Congressional Record, v. 41:21; Cf. Rev. Revs., v 39:396-398
(April, 1909).
(2) Congressional Record, V'41:22-34.
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 322-324.
LaFollette, Autobiography, 439-452.
(4) Rev. Revs., v 39:521 (May, 1909);; v 39:653 (June, 1909);
V 40:9-10 (July, 1909); v 40:138 (August , 1909)
.
(5) Congressional Record, v. 45:3428, 3451.
(6) ibid., V 45:3428-3436.
(7) ibid. V. 45:3438-3439.
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Every move of the Insurgents was made agaittet-- ovonthelming
-»^de
,
atiA in the face of bitter opposition. Aldrioh and the other
Republican Regular leaders made occasional attempts to outlaw thera
from the party; but such attempts did not impress either the people
at large nsr the Insurgents. To one such attempt, Senator Clapp
defiantly rejoined that the so-called Insurgents could justify
themselves better than the Aldrich program to their States. (1)
At first, it was not apparent where President Taft would
throw the great force of his influence in these factional strug-
gles. At the beginning of his administration, to the dismay of the
Insurgents, { 2) he had declined to lend his aid in their opposition
to Cannon's election as Speaker. (3)
Taft's first message to Congress caused further surprise and
uneasiness among the Insurgents. The message was extremely brief;
there was no trace of the expected "vigorous demand for downward
revision of the tariff"; and"the one thing emphasized was the im-
portance of disposing of the tariff as early as possible"
. (4)
Still the Insurgents were loath to give up their hopes of the
President's friendship and help. (6) lAPollette earnestly sought
to arouse Taft's opposition to the Payne-Aldrich Bill; (6) the
(1) Rev. Revs., v. 40:9-10 (July, 1909).
iZ) "To the dismay of every one", LaFollette broadly describes it.
LaPollette, Autobiography, 437.
(3) Rev. Revs., v 39:6-7 (Jan. ,1909).
(4) LaPollette, Autobiography, 438.
(5) ibid.
(6) ibid., 439-441, 448-450.
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Insurgents continued to quote to the Regulars President Taft's
campaign promise to work for downward revision; (1) and as late as
the end of May, 1909, Senator Bevoridge contended that Taft was a
consistent advocate of downward revision.
Finally, however, it became evident to everyone that President
Taft had definitely allied himself with the Regulars of the Party.
During the tariff struggle he was charged rith using the executive
patronage to club the Insurgents into line; (2) he attempted to
win over individual Insurgents ; (3) and finally "five months after
(4)
he was inaugurated he signed a bill that revised the tariff upward"
and that was pronounced by an impartial review as "a most monstrous
and iniquitous performance" .{ 5)
After the passage of the Payne -Aldrich Bill, President Taft
more and more went over to the leadership of the j:tegular Repub-
licans. He took up cudgels in defense of the Payne-Aldrich Bill;{6)
he entered upon a legislative program which seemed to many people
to be subversive of the interests of Practical Domocracy; ( 7) and
he used the full influence of his position to discredit and read
out of the party the Insurgents. ( 8)
(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 447.
(2) ibid.. 462-456. Also cf. Rev. Revs., v 41:138 ff. (Feb., 1910)
(3) LaPollette, Autobiography, 450-461
(4) ibid., 476.
(5) Rev. Revs, v 40:2^0 (Sept.. 1909).
(6) LaPollette. Autobiography, 477; Rev. Revs. . v 43:261(Mar. . 1911)
.
(7) LaFollette. Autobiography. 457-458, 477-478.
(8) Rev. Revs., v 41:396 (April, 1910); v 42: 4-6 (July. 1910).
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The unpopularity of this attitude was evidenced by the Con-
gressional elections of 1910, when the Democrats succeeded in elect-
ing a majority of the members of the House. (1) The Insurgents,
however, calmly held to their course, frequently allying themselves
with the Democrats, and always exerting an influence out of propor-
tion to their numbers. (2)
But the climax of the Insurgent Movement came on January 21,
1911, when a group of Insurgents met at the home of Senator La-
Pollette, and founded the National Progressive Republican League. (3)
At last, Republican Insurgency was organized.
By every consideration of political principles, this Insurgent
organization was the real predecessor of the Progressive Party of
1912. (4) The League of 1911 affirmed its belief in five principles:
1. The direct election of United States Senators;
2. Direct primaries;
3. Direct election of national convention delegates, with a
preferential Presidential primary;
4. The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall;
5. thoroughgoing corrupt practices act. "(5)
(1) Rev. Revs., v 42i672 (Dec. 1910); v 43:261 (March, 1911)
(2) Rev. Revs., v 43:159 (Feb. ,1911), 394 (April, 1911) , 522
(May, 1911). 656, 673 (June, 1911); v 44:161 (Aug. ,1911),
264,288 (Sept. ,1911) . American Magazine v72:59-64 (May, 1911).
(3) LaFollette, Autobiography, 494 ff.
(4) DeV/itt, Progressive Movement, 70.
(5) LaFollette, Autobiography, 496.
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All of these principlee were expressions of the struggle for
Practical Deinocracy; and the same principles can be found reiter-
ated in the Progressive platform of 1912.
During Taft's administration Insurgency grew from the activi-
ties of a small group of Senators and Representatives to the posi-
tion of a large wing of the Republican party, with the leaders band-
ed together upon a platform demanding more Practical Democracy.
This great growth of the Insurgent Movement during the brief span
of one administration may be attributed to two facts:
1. The opposition of Taft. Taft's open espousal of the Reg-
ular Republican program 'welded together the Progressive (i.e..
Insurgent) strength of the country, and sharpened and clearly de-
fined the issues". (1)
2. The preparatory work done by President Roosevelt, in awak-
ening the public conscience to the need for more Practical Democ-
racy. (2)
The next step in the evolution of the Progressive Party was
the blending of the courses of Roosevelt and of Insurgency.
(1) laPollette, Autobiography, 478. This is almost a self-evident
fact, and can be appreciated from any reading of the political
history of Taft's administration.
(2) This view is in consonance with the conclusions expressed in
pages 58-59 ofthis chapter, and is in flat contradiction to
some of the views of Senator LaPollette, as expressed in his
Autobiography. LaPollette apparently believes that Roosevelt
is fundamentally insincere, and that he was never an exponent
of even the spirit of Practical Democracy. It seems to me that
careful judgment upon Roosevelt's administration will not con-
firm the view of LaFollette, which seems to show the emotional
warping of judgment due to his own unfortunate contact with




THE NOMINATION GAIIPAIGN OF 1912
The Candidacy of Poosevelt
«
On June 18, 1910, Theodore Roosevelt returned to the United
States from Africa and Europe. He at once became a storm-center of
political interest. Everywhere political leaders questioned what
would "be his attitude towards the constantly diverging factions in
the Republican Party.
Roosevelt did not at once throw himself into the struggle nor
ally himself with either side. He held aniceble conferences with
both Taft and LaPollette; ( 1) and "many, who did not know him" be-
gan to believe that perhaps he had definitely decided to refrain
from all further entrance into politics. (E)
But his abstention from politics was brief. In New York poli-
tics, "the cleavage between the reformist Hughes wing of the Re-
publicans and the 'rer^ular' group headed by Mr. William
Barnes had developed into an open breach". At the request of the
Hughes men, "Roosevelt plunged into the state contest, defeated
Vice-President Sherman in a hot fight for the chairmanship of the
state convention, and secured the nomination of Mr. H. A. atimson
as the Republican candidate for governor ". (3) The platform adopted
was "colorless enough for the most conservative party member"; (4)
(1) Rev. Revs., v 41:559-560 (May, 1910); v 42:394-396 {Oct., 1910);
LaPollette, Autobiography, 487 ff.





and, indeed praised the Payne-Aldrioh tariff and "enthusiaatioally
endorsed" President Taft and his policies. (1)
Roosevelt's course of action in the New York campaign did not
of itself alienate him from the Taft administration. Taft was said
to have repudiated the Barnes -Woodruff group, before the campaign;
and such loyal followers of Taft as Root, Depew, Payne, and Passett
supported Roosevelt in the state convention. ( 2) Moreover, the
platform, which Roosevelt supported, or at least did not oppose,
was, as we have said, an endorsement of the Taft administration.
But even during the New York campaign, Roosevelt made a tour
of the West, proclaiming his belief in various radical principles
and methods of governmental reform designed to secure more practi-
cal democracy. For example, in his widely-read address on "The
New Nationalism," delivered at Ossawataraie, Kansas, on August 31,
I
1910, he advocated "Federal regulation of trusts, a graduated in-
come tax, tariff revision schedule by schedule, conservation, la-
bor legislation, the direct primary, recall of elective officers,
and the adjustment of state and Federal relations in such a form
that there might be no neutral ground to serve as a refuge for law-
breakers". (3)
At the formation of the National Progressive Republican League,
Rposevelt was invited to join; but he disappointed the members of
(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 491.
(2) Rev. Revs., v 42:645-646 (Dec, 1910).
(3) Thus summarized in Beard, Contemporary History, 350.
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the League by withholding his name and prestige from the movement .( 1)
The Insurgents (2) of the League went on with their plans. At a
oonferenoe in Washington, on April 30, 1911. it res determined that
the Insurgents should unite upon some one man who should oppose Taft
for the Republican nomination, senator LaFollette was recognized as
the real leader of the Insurgent movement, and all or most of the
men In this conference pledged hin thdlr support. (3)
After assuring himself of financial backing for the campaign,
LaFollette launched his candidacy in July, 1911. He quickly develop-
ed unexpected strength, especially in the Middle West; and in Octo-
ber, 1911, the first "national conference of Progressive Republi-
cans" endorsed LaFollette ' s candidacy. (4)
But in the meantime, a new factor had become prominent in the
situation. Everywhere men were asking, 'T,h&t will Roosevelt do?"
and the answer was profoundly doubtful.
When Roosevelt had nearly completed his second administration,
in 1908, there were many who desired to see him again become a can-
didate for the Presidency. But to all those who argued that the
precedent of Washington, Jefferson, and Grant did not lie against
Roosevelt, who had had but one elective term, he reiterated the
(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 496-497.
(2) The terra "Insurgents" is used in order to avoid confusion with
the members of the Progressive Party of 1912. The "Insurgents"
themselves called themselves "Progressives" or "Progressive
Republicans", - a term more appropriate than "Insurgents",
at this stage of their growth.
:
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 345-346.
!
LaFollette, Autobiography, 516 ff,
:





Btateraent whioh he had made after the election of 1904: "The wise
custom which limits the President to two terras regards the sub-
stance and not the form. Under no circumstances will 1 he a candi-
date for or accept another nomination". ( 1) Finally, to the con-
tinued cry for his renomination. he replied on December 11, 1907,
by calling attention to his statement of 1904, and by adding, "I
have not changed and shall not change the decision thus announcedy ( 2)
When he returned to the United States in 1910, he of course
gave no sign of any change in his purpose; yet many people refused
to relinquish the conviction that Roosevelt might be induced to be-
come a candidate for the Presidency in 1912. His entrance into the
New York campaign was evidence of a continued and active interest
in politics; and as early as January, 1911, a German writer spoke
of "his seemingly renewed aspiration for the presidency". (3)
However, LaFollette was apparently assured by close friends of
Roosevelt that Roosevelt would not be a candidate; (4) and on August
22, 1911, Roosevelt wrote: "I must ask ..... every friend 1 have,
to see to it that no movement is made to bring me forward for nom-
ination in 1912 I should esteem it a genuine calamity if
such a movement were undertaken. "(5)
(1) Rev. Revs., v 30:646 (Dec, 1904).
(2) Rev. Revs., v 37:4 (Jan. ,1908).
(3) Rev. Revs., v 43:93-94 (Jan., 1911).
(4) Beard, Contemporary History, 346.
LaFollette, Autobiography, 516 ff.
(5) Beard, op. cit., 351.
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Nevertheless, he oontlnuod to dlBouas current iBsuee from a
point of view which seemed increasingly progressive and hostile to
the Taft administration; and "friendly as well as unfriendly news-
papers insisted on viewing his conduct as a distinct appeal for
popular support for the Republican nomination" .( 1)
On l^ecember 81, 1911, steps were taken by certain Nebraska
voters to have the name of Theodore Roosevelt placed on the ballot
to be used in the State presidential primary. (2) A little more than
a month later. Senator laFollette, in a speech made on February 2,
1912, showed evident signs of physical weakness and nervous over-
strain. (3) At once, Gifford Pinchot , who had been supporting la-
Pollette (though not with all the eagerness the Senator desired),
declared that, "In my judgment LaPollette' s condition makes fur-
ther serious candidacy impossible". (4)
Pinchot and other men thereupon transferred their allegiance
from LaPollette to Roosevelt, joining in the cry for Roosevelt to
become a candidate; (5) and this, in spite of the fact that La-
Pollette '3 recovery was rapid and apparently complete. (6)
(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 351.
(2) Hev. Revs., v 45:160 (Feb., 1912).
(3) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 76-77.
LaFollette. Autobiography, 602-610.
(4) LaFollette, op. cit., 612.
(5) Rev. Revs., v 45:267 (March, 1912), 423, 427 (April, 1912)
.
Payne - Birth of New Party, 47.
(6) La^'ollette, Autobiography, 609-610. Of. also the current issues
of LaPollette 's Weekly Mag&zine.
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The turning point to tho Rooaevelt ""boom" came on February 10,
1912, when seven Republican governors signed an open letter to
Roosevelt, calling upon him to become a candidate for the Republi-
can nomination.
On i'ebruary 21, after a progressive speech before the Ohio
Constitutional Convention, Roosevelt characteristically declared,
"M3^ hat is in the ringT'd) and on February 24, he formally re-
plied to the Governor s' letter, saying '*1 will accept the nomination
if it is tendered to me by the Republican presidential conven-
tion**. (2)
Was Roosevelt justified in entering the race for the Repu.blican
nomination in 1912? He hae been violently criticized for his course,
by two different groups of men and for two reasons:
I. William Jennings Bryan and others have emphasized Roose-
velt's proposed violation of the "third term tradition" that no
American president should have more than two terms in office. (3)
2x LaPollette and his friends have claimed that by entering
the race, Roosevelt split the real progressive wing of the Repub-
lican Party, and that his action worked a profound injustice upon
lAFollette and his candidacy.
How just and how important are these charges?
In the first place, the third-term tradition is fairly estab-
lished in the political approval of the American people; though it
would undoubtedly be promptly over-ridden if required by any na-
(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 618.
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 619; Rev. Revs., v 45:391.
(3) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 306-307.
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tional emergency. In 1907 and 1908, many friends of Roosevelt made
the point tliat his first terra was by virtue of suocession, and that
he had therefore had but one eleot ive terra. But Roosevelt is es-
topped from this plea (which has, indeed, a certain evidence of the
legal viewpoint which does not jump with Roosevelt's genius) by his
own words in 1904, when he praised the third-term tradition as a
"wise custom" and declared that it regarded "the substance and not
the form".(l)
Yet Boosevelt's words in 1904 were a statement of intention,
not a promise to any person or group of persons. It is difficult to
see that he broke faith with anybody by changing his mind and de-
ciding to run in 1916. The obvious charge is one of flat inconsist-
ency, and from this Roosevelt cannot be defended. Most people would
justify such inconsistency if they felt that Roosevelt's candidacy
was demanded by a national crisis of some sort. But no one has ever
satisfactorily answered Bryants pointed question, "What emergency
requires it?" (8)
AS far as the third-terra tradition is concerned, Roosevelt had
an undoubted legal and moral right to enter the race for the nom-
ination; but his inconsistency in upholding the third-term tradi-
tion in 1908 and braving it in 1912, without any justifying emer-
gency, undoubtedly weakened his candidacy and cost him many votes.
The second charge, that Roosevelt split the progressive Repub-
licans and broke faith with LaFollette, is more serious. The
(1) Of. p. 71
(2) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 307. The italics are ours.
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events of 1912 confirmed LaPolletto In a profound diatrust of and
hostility to Roosevelt. In his Autobiography
.
LaFollette raakee an
exhaustive effort to show that Roosevelt's friends - and by im-
plication, Roosevelt - acted in had faith toward LaPolletto, in
connection with the Republican nomination of 1912.
LaPollette's theory of the Roosevelt campaign is suiistant ially
as follows :(1) V/hen Roosevelt left the V/hite House in 1909, he al-
ready "had 1916 firmly in his mind". When he returned in 1910 he
at first attempted to straddle, thus breaking with neither Taft nor
the Insurgents. This policy"left him awkwardly stranded" in the New
York election of 1910. In 1911, Roosevelt made a speaking tour
which renewed his self-confidence so completely that "he began to
think of 1912 for himself". However, he felt loath to enter the con-
test with Taft (for the sake of his "place in history"), unless vic-
tory seemed reasonably certain. Consequently, he pretended to favor
the LaFollette candidacy, using iaPollette as a stalking horse to
try out the progressive sentiment of the people. The LaFollette
candidacy continued to gather strength. Finally, at an opportune
momen\{Z) Roosevelt entered the lists as an avowed progressive Re-
publican candidate, thus dooming LaFollette to failure.
While Senator LaFollette is undoubtedly sincere in proposing
such an explanation of the facts, a fairminded observer cannot help
but see that the great personal cost of the campaign to him has
clouded hisuusually accurate judgment and has blinded him with
prejudice against Roosevelt.
Ti) ^LaFollette, Autobiography, 509-512.
(8) Of., p. 72
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In oritioiem Of LaPollette* a theory the following points may
be urged:
I. The truth of the LaFollette theory as a whole involves
the belief that Roosovelt is essentially insincore and unscrupulous,
- a view which is not borne out by his general course of actions
in public life.(l)
II. There is not one iota of evidence that "when Roosevelt
left the White House he had 1916 firmly in mind". This is pure sur-
mise.
III. It is true that Roosevelt did not at once ally himself
with either faction in the Party, upon his return to America; but
this so-called"straddling" may easily have been through a sincere
desire for party harmony, through his desire for being practical
and getting things done, and through personal regard for Taft and
personal distrust in LaFollette as an uncompromising radical.
Roosevelt's position in the New York campaign was, indeed, somewhat
illogical; (2) but nice differences of logic and economic thinking
have never seemed as important to Roosevelt as to LaFollette. (3)
IV. A careful reading of the exhaustive evidence adduced by
LaFollette, (4) does not show that Roosevelt ever personally assured
LaFollette that he would support LaFollette and would not run him-
self; though there is strong evidence of duplicity and double-
dealing on the part of friends of Roosevelt. But j/t i_s not proved
that Roosevelt deliberately used or attempted to use LaFollette
(1) Cf. Chapter III. p. 50 79
(8) LaFollette, Autobiography, 491-492;DeWitt , Progressive Movement/
(3) Cf. Chapter III. p. 52-54
(4) LaFollette, Autobiography, 512 ff.
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as a stalking horse, nor that he planned dellherato unfairness or
injustice to LaFollette.
Roosevelt did enter the contest when he knew that his entrance
would ruin the LaFollette campaign; but it is impossihle to prove
that the entered the race purely from personal ambition, and with-
out sincere devotion to the principles which he advocated.
In the last analysis the situation which developed between
Roosevelt and LaFollette is due to the fact that the two men are
so different in some of their mental attitudes that they are in-
capable of understanding each other.
"Roosevelt, it is true, had never been a progressive in the
same sense that LaPollette had. YJhile LaFollette had been rigidly
uncompromising in his relations with special interests, Roosevelt
had yielded whenever it was possible to forge ahead by doing so.
Roosevelt fought consistently for good government and human rights
step by step, interpreting the cause in terms of existing needs and
always keeping just a little in advance. LaFollette, on the other
hand, laid down his program far ahead and stuck to it T7ith savage
persistence and heroic fidelity. It is because of these differences
that the two men have never been able fully to understand each
other. { 1)
At any rate, the entrance of Roosevelt into the race for the
nomination divided the progressive wing of the Republican Party,
and brought LaFollette and his supporters into definite and con-
tinued opposition to Roosevelt.
(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 78-79.
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The Fight for the I^omlnatlon.
As soon as Roosevelt had announced his oandidacy. Senator
Dixon of Montana was chosen to manage his campaign for the Republi-
oan nomination. Dixon promptly challenged Taft's campaign manager
to arrange for a nation-^ride Republican preferential presidential
primary.
The challenge v:as, of course, not accepted. The Taft forces
were inoontrolof the administration, and they had not the slight-
est intention of foregoing the immense advantage of the distribu-
tion of federal patronage.
Acoording to orthodox Republican tradition, the Southern
States began, early in 191£, to return "shadow" delegations in-
structed to support President Taft for the nomination. (1) Added to
these were "the delegates selected in northern states by the power
of patronage". ( 2)
But in some important states, presidential primary laws had
already been passed; and these forced the candidates to join issue
before the people. (3) In proportion to their former intimacy, the
struggle between Taft and Roosevelt was now characterized by bit-
terness and recrimination, this personal element even obscuring,
in many cases, the political principles upon which the contestants
differed. (4)
(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 35E; DeWitt, Progressive Movement,
80-81; Rev. Revs., v 45:264, (March, 1912).
(g) Beard, op. cit., 354; Cf. Rev. Revs., 46:387 (April, 1912)
.
(3) Beard, op. cit., 367.
(4) Beard, op. cit., 357;
DeWitt, Progressive movement, 80.
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Nevertheless, it was clear to all that Taft was the conserv-
ative upholder of conditions as they were; while many, if not most.
Republicans saw in Roosevelt an available leader of progressive
Republicanism, and a real champion of Practical Democracy. ( 1)
At any rate, Roosevelt swept the strategic states which em-
ployed presidential primaries, which seems to show that under con-
ditions which afforded a real chance for expression from all Repub-
lican voters, Roosevelt would probably have been the choice of the
Party for the nomination. ( 2)
However, when Roosevelt announced his candidacy, more than a
hundred delegates had already been selected, - most of them from
the South. &3 a Roosevelt paper said, "Per psychological effect,
as a move in practical politics, it was necessary for the Roosevelt
people to start contests on these early Taft selections, in order
that a tabulation of delegate strength could be put out that would
show Roosevelt holding a good hand in the game. A table showing
*Taft, 150; Roosevelt, 19; contested, none', would not be very much
calculated to inspire confidence. Whereas, one showing 'Taft, E3;
Roosevelt, 19; contested, 127', looked very different. That is the
whole story of the large number of southern contests that were
started early in the game. It was never expected that they would be
taken very seriously; they served a useful purpose, and now the
Hational Committee is deciding them in favor of Taft; in most
oases without any real division". (3)
(1) Beard, op. cit., 359; DeWitt, Op. cit., 359.
(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 368, 361-362.
(3) Quoted in LaFollette, Autobiography, 667-668, from Judson C.
Welliver in Washington Times of June 9, 1912.
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Other contests, with a more serious hasis of evidence, were
later initiated by the Roosevelt managers. The struggle over these
ooatestt soon became the absorbing center of the fight for the nom-
ination. The contests were carried onto the floor of the Convention,
and the decision of these contested oases was the immediate cause
for the formation of the Progressive Party.
The Republican Convention met in Chicago from June 18th to
June 22nd. There were 1078 seats in the convention, with 540 votes
necessary to a nomination. There were 106 contests, involving 248
seats. (1) In accordance with the party custom, the first hearings
of the contests were before the National Committee, (2) which was
empowered to make up the temporary roll of the Convention
The Republican Convention.
In the Convention, Governor Herbert 3. Hadley of Missouri was
the floor leader of the Roosevelt forces in the Convention; James
E. Watson of Indiana was the Taft floor manager. As soon as the Con-
vention had been called to order by Victor Rosewater, Chairman of
the National Committee, Hadloy moved that the temporary roll be
amended, in favor of the Roosevelt contestants unseated by the
National Committee. (3) Parliamentary law and Republican precedent
were conclusively shown to be against such a motion; and Chairman
(1) The figures are taken from DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 81-82.
(2) This Committee of course "held over" from the previous conven-
tion, and was under the control of the Taft administration.
Bryan declared that one of the chief lessons of the nomination
fight was that no such power should be lodged in the hands of
a hold-over committee.
(3) Proceedings of the 15th Republican National Convention, 1912,32.
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Rosewator ruled Hadley's root ion out of order, refusing to allow an
appeal, on the ground that the convention was not formally organ-
ized until the election of a temporary Chairman. ( 1)
The name of Elihu Hoot was presented by the National Committee
for Temporary Chairman. This provoked the first open fight, the
Roosevelt men opposing Root as a Taft supporter. The Roosevelt ad-
herents made a shrewd effort to annex the strength of the independ-
ent lePollette delegates, by nominating as the Roosevelt candidate.
Governor McGovern of Wisconsin. But Houser. LaPollette's manager,
declared, for his candidate, upon the floor of the convention, that
"he refuses to be forced into such an alliance," - a
somewhat refreshing departure from the political log-rolling which
characterized most of the convention proceedings. (£)
Over the protests of the Rooe^evelt men, the vote was taken
according to the temporary roll containing the names of the Taft
contestants. (3) The vote was announced: Root 558, McGovern 501; (4)
but in spite of Root's well-recognized personal ability and reputa-
tion, "when he stepped forward to deliver his address, the applause
that greeted him ?.'as broken by cries of 'Receiver of stolen goodsi* '
(5)
(1) proceedings, 3£-42.
(2) Proceedings, 54; Cf. LaPollette, Autobiography, 644-667.
(3) This, of course, followed as a necessary consequence of Rose-
water's earlier ruling; and its parliamentary correctness canhardly be questioned.
(ft) Proceedings, 61.




After the Chairman's address, Hadley renewed his motion for
the seating of the Roosevelt contestants. The debate on this motion
involved the detailed and bitter discussion of the various con-
tests involved. (1) In the end, Hadley's motion was referred to the
Committee on Credentials. (E) An attempt was made by the Roosevelt
followers to exclude the contested delegates from voting; but it
was over-ruled both by a clear parliamentary ruling of the Chair,
and by the vote of the Convention. 567 to 507.(3)
A recess of two days was taken, while the Credentials Com-
mittee held its hearings. On June 21, the Credentials Committee
began its reports upon the contests. The reports of the Committee,
in favor of Taft contestants, and the minority reports, favoring
the Roosevelt contestants, discussed the evidence presented in the
contests.
The National Committee, favoring the administration, had
placed most of the Taft contestants upon the temporary roll of the
convention. Under the usual rules of parliamentary law, (4) each of
these 7E contested delegates was allowed to vote in the case of
every contest save his own. It soon became evident that this would
assure a safe majority for Taft. The Roosevelt leaders offered
(1) Proceedings, 106-143.
(S) ibid., 16£.
(3) ibid., 160. Note the admission of a Roosevelt man that . .
the ruling • . • may be defended as a ruling on an abstract





dogged resistance to what they denominated the Taft "steam-roller";
but with methodical precision, "the motion of Mr. Watson, of Indi-
ana, to lay on the table the motion of Mr. Hadley, of Missouri,
was agreed to", and "the report was agreed to".(l)
Finally, the contests were finished, the permanent roll was
read; and, without debate or objection, the temporary officers
were chosen the permanent officers of the Convention.
Just at this point came the dramatic climax of the fight for
the Republican nomination. Henry J. Allen, of Kansas, mounted the
platform and declared, for the Roosevelt delegates, that they
would take no further active part in the Convention, Allen read
to the Convention a letter from Theodore Roosevelt in which he
eaid:
"The Convention has now declined to purge the roll of the
fraudulent delegates placed thereon by the defunct National Com-
mittee, and the majority which thus endorsed fraud was made a ma-
jority only because it included the fraudulent delegates themselves,
who all sat as judges on one another ^s cases. If these fraudulent
votes had not thus been cast and counted, the Convention would
have been purged of their presence. This action makes the Conven-
tion in no proper sense any longer a Republican Convention rep-
resenting the real Republican party. Therefore, I hope the men
elected as Roosevelt delegates will now decline to vote on any
matter before the Convention. I do not release any delegate from
his honorable obligation to vote for me if he votes at all, but
under the actual conditions I hope that he will not vote at all.
(1) Proceedings, 190 and passim.
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"The Conrention as now composed has no claira to represent the
voters of the Republican party. It represents nothing but success-
ful fraud in over-riding the will of the rank and file of the party.
Any man nominated by the Convention as now constituted would be
merely the beneficiary of this successful fraud; it would be deeply
discreditable to any man to accept the Conrention's nomination un-
der these circumstances; and any man thus accepting it would have
no claira to the support of any Republican on party grounds, and
would have forfeited the right to ask the support of any honest
man of any party on moral grounds". fl)
With this indictment of the Taft majority, many of the Roose-
velt delegates left the convention; and most of those who remained
lapsed into an attitude of passive protest, refusing to vote on
roll call, (2) - an attitude which differed very little from an act-
ual bolt.
The Republican Convention followed out the regular order of
business, re-nominated Taft (3) and Sherman, and adopted a platform
of which Bryan wrote: "It points with pride to what he (Mr. Taft)
has done and views with alarm all that Mr. Roosevelt stands for
and threatens to do. "(4)
(1) Proceedings, 333.
(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 361.
,
(3) The vote for the candidates for the nomination for President
;
was as follows: Taft, 561; Roosevelt, 107; LaFollette, 41;
j
Cummings, 17; Hughes, 2; present and not voting, 344; 'absent 6.
j
(4) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 83-84.
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The Taft forces retained the battlefield, "but they could not
fail to recognize how forlorn was the hope that led thorn on."(i)
The Republican Party had been split upon the issue of a "stolen
nomination".
The Merits of the Contests.
Even if the time and space were available for an exhaustive
examination of the merits of the contests, a definite and impartial
decision would be impossible in many cases, because of the incom-
pleteness of the evidence. The evidence presented in the Proceed-
ings of the Republican Convention is little more than a summary of
the main points involved, numerous questions of fact are raised
which are impossible of decision without the weighing of the testi-
mony of witnesses; important exhibits, as of the Washington case, (2)
are wanting; and a phenomeaal loiowledge of party rules and prece-
dents would be necessary to decide the technical points of proced-
ure involved.
The analysis of the contests issued by the direction of Roose-
velt(5) and of Taft are not very helpful in forming an impartial
Judgment; for both are marked more by bitter partisanship, invec-
ture, intolerance, and unfairness than by reason and argument,
(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 361.
(2) Proceedings, 116.
(3) Outlook, 101:571-676. July 13, 1912 (not July 12, 1913 as
incorrectly given in DeWitt. Progressive Movement
,
81).'
(4) Printed in the Republican papers of July 29, 1912. e.g., St.
Louis Globe
-Democrat, July 29, 1912, p. 6.
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But the question of the contests is important, for the termi-
nation of the contests was the immediate cause of the formation of
the Progressive Party. Though a complete decision upon the contests
is impossible, the following points should be noted as of real im-
portance:
1. "Wherever the rank and file of the (Hepublican) voters had
an opportunity to express themselves honestly, it was found that
the Republican party was overwhelmingly opposed to the Taft admin-
istration "(1) The real strength of the Party lay with
Roosevelt rather than Taft; for the Taft "majority" was composed
largely of shadow delegates from the South; while most of the
actual Republican states lined up for Roosevelt. Also, "in nearly
every state where there had been a preferential primary Mr. Roose-
velt had carried the day". (2)
2. On the other hand, the legal and parliamentary procedure
of the Taft forces was, in general, unimpeachably correct.
3. The Taft men undoubtedly used the power of the administra-
tion in every possible way to gain their end. The shadow delega-
tions of the South were welded into a compact machine to "steam-
roll" all opposition. All this was inequitable; but it was only
more obvious and important, and not more unjust in 1912 than it
was in 1908, when Roosevelt had used the same methods in behalf
of Taft. (3)
(1) Rev. Reva., 46:3 ( J\ily, 1912).
(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 361-2.
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 364, 358.
Of. DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 62.
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4. Probably a large number of the oontests Judged by the
National Committee and Credentials Committee were decided on the
basis of partisanship instead of on their merits; though the Roose-
velt claims in this regard are probably greatly exaggerated.
5. "The conclusion of the whole matter seems to be that nei-




"The importance of the charge made by Mr. Roosevelt that the
nomination was stolen from him, led LaFollette 's Weekly Magazine
to engage Mr. Gilbert Roe, of New York City, to analyze the evi-
dence of all the proceedings bearing upon the seating of delegates
whose title was in dispute". (2) This was evidently intended as a
scientific and impartial examination of the contests; and, in spite
of LaFollette's personal bias, there is no real reason for dis-
trusting the accuracy of Mr. Roe's results. In brief, he decided,
after analyzing the evidence and the votes, that even if all of the
seventy-two contestants named in the Hadley resolution had been
seated as Roosevelt delegates, still Roosevelt would not have had
enough votes to nominate him. (3) All of this corresponds with the
fact that "the burden of Roosevelt's argument is not that he
(Roosevelt) was entitled to a majority of the delegates, but that -
Taft 's, majority ........ ... was not honest". (4)
(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 82.
(2) laFollette's Autobiogrp ohy , 658-659. Mr. Roe's first article
appeared in .LaFollette
' Magazine for July 20, 1912.
(3) LaPollette's Autobiography, 668-666.
(4) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 82.
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In equity and justice, Taft was probably not entitled to the
Republican nomination of 1912. But it does not therefore follow
that he "stole" a nomination which "belonged to" Theodore Roosevelt.
The Progressive Party was founded upon the belief in a case that




THE FORMATION OP THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
Organizing the New Party,
The Republican National Convention adjourned on ,Tune 22, 1912.
The same night, an enthusiastic mass meeting of Roosevelt *b sup-
porters was held in Orchestra Hall, Chicago, and the birth of a
new political party was foreshadowed. The sentiment of most of the
Roosevelt men was crystallized into a definite demand for a third
party, with Roosevelt as its leader and candidate. Roosevelt ac-
cepted this call, but declared that a nomination at this time could
be only an informal one. He therefore asked the delegates to go
back to their constituencies and find out the sentiment of the peo-
ple at home, and then to come together, by mass convention, to nom-
inate "a progressive candidate on a progressive platform". In ad-
dition Colonel Roosevelt added: "The only condition I impose is
that you shall feel entirely free when you come together to substi-
tute any other man in my place if you deem it better for the move-
ment, and in such case I will give him my heartiest support". (1)
This Orchestra Hall meeting was not a "rump convention", as
it has been incorrectly called. There was no pretension that the
delegates present possessed the powers or the organization of a
convention. It was a mass meeting which approved of the formation
of a new party, and which tentatively expressed its preference for
(1) Chicago Daily Tribune, June 24, 1917, p. 3.
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the candidate of that party. It is soaroely proper to speak of this
meeting as the beginning of the Progressive Party. It was rather
the public expression of the determination to have a new party, -
a transition step from bolting the old party to organizing the new.
Prom the point of view of party organization, the birth of the
Progressive Party was accomplished at a smaller mass meeting of the
Roosevelt delegates held in the Florentine Room of the Congress Ho-
tel, Chicago, on Sunday morning, June 23. 1912, (1) This was essen-
tially an organization meeting. Colonel Roosevelt was not present,
and Governor Hiram Johnson of California, one of the chief Roose-
velt leaders in the Republican Convention, presided.
James R. Garfield was recognized at this meeting, and he moved
"that the chairman be given power to select seven men who, with
himself, shall confer with Colonel Roosevelt for the purpose of de-
vising a plan of action for the new organization".
The motion was adopted by a viva voce vote.
"There", said Governor Johnson, "is the birth of the new
party". After considering one or two other questions of organiza-
tion, the delegates dispersed to their homes.
Immediately after the Republican Convention, the Democratic
National Convention met in Baltimore. Here there was the same bit-
ter hostility of conservatives and radicals, though the lines had
been less dramatically drawn. But here, the most popular leader of
the party, William Jennings Bryan, had come to the convention to
fight for the nomination of a progressive Democrat other th^n




himself. A few days earlier, Bryan had written to Roosevelt: "Had
he espoused the cause of any other progressive and given to it the
time and energy that he has devoted to his own candidacy he could
have controlled the convention and made himself master of the or-
ganization of his party". (1) This Bryan did. He forced the fight
from the outset, using "Roosevelt's prospective party as a club to
bring the reactionaries into line". (2) Finally, by skillful polit-
ical tactics, Bryan secured the nomination of Governor Woodrow
Wilson, of New Jersey, who was considered a progressive, though he
stood high in the estimation of almost the entire Party,
Had the Democrats nominated a thoroughgoing conservative, con-
siderable secessions, of voters if not of leaders, would probably
have been made to the proposed "new party" to be organized by the
Roosevelt supporters. But since the Democrats had declared for an
apparently progressive candidate, there was some doubt among inde-
pendents as to the necessity of organizing a third party in the
interests of progressive action or of Practical Democraoy.
"Nevertheless, when the Roosevelt delegates accompanied by a
host of followers who had been attracted to the movement since the
convention in June, met in Chicago on August 5, they reported that
a canvass of the sentiment of the voters in their respective dis-
tricts indicated a demand for a third party". (3)
(1) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 12.
(2) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 83.
(3) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 84.
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The Progressive Convention of 1912.
The Convention of the new National Progressive Party was call-
ed to order at 12:30 p.m. on August 5, 1912, by Senator Dixon, the
manager of Roosevelt's oarapaign. 0. K. Davis read the call for the
convention; then Senator Albert T. Beveridge was elected Temporary
Chairman, and he opened the real business of the Convention by an
able keynote speech, later reprinted under the title, "Pass Pros-
perity Around".
At the next session, during the afternoon of August 6, Colonel
Roosevelt addressed the Convention with a long "Confession of
Faith", in which he declared for the whole "progressive" program
later adopted into the platform.
On the final day of the Convention, August 7, the temporary
officers were made permanent, rules were adopted, and the Conven-
tion proceeded to its real business of nominating candidates and
adopting a platform.
The nominating speech for Colonel Roosevelt was made by Wm.
A. Prendergast of New York, and was the signal for a great demon-
stration. One of the notable events of the Convention was the sec-
onding speech by Miss Jane Addams, of Hull House, which "marked the
entreuace of woman into national politics in a new sense". (1) After
the other seconding speeches, the Progressive Platform was unani-
mously adopted as presented by the Resolutions Committee.
The choice of candidates was then made, and by acclamation
(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 86.
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Theodore Roosevelt was nominated for President €md Hiram W. Johnson
for Vioe-President . Appearing before the Convention, the candidates
acoepted the honor ajid responsihility laid upon them, and pledged
their devotion to the cause .rf Progressivisro, so closing one of the
most remarkable political conventions in American history. (1) "The
convention, which had been made unusual by the singing of hymns
and patriotic songs, adjourned at 7:24 on Wednesday evening with
the singing of the doxology, and a benediction". (E)
Almost all who have written of this Convention have mentioned
the replacement of the usual system of political manipulation by an
almost religious fervor and intensity, - a sense of devotion to a
new crusade for social and political justice and democracy. The
presence of this feeling is not to be taken too seriously; the same
high spirit of consecration to ideals breathes forth in the speech-
es of Alexander Stephens upon the outbreak of the Civil War, in the
"Farmers' Declaration of Independence" written by the Grrangers, ( 3)
(1) The proceedings of the Progressive Convention were never pub-
lished. "The 'Proceedings of the Progressive National Conven-
tion at Chicago, 1912' was not printed. The only report we
have is that of the official stenographer, who reported the
Conirention. " Letter to the writer from 0. K. Davis, Secreta-
ry, Progressive National Convention, October 9, 1914.
Brief mention of the Convention is made in Beard, Contem-
porary History, 370-372 and DeWitt, Progressive Movement,
84-86; but the best and most complete brief account is given
in Bryan's Tale of Two Conventions, 247-249.
The description here given is based upon the Associated
Press reports published in the Chicago Daily Tribune of
August 5-8.
(2) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 249.
(3) Cf. Chapter I, p. 12, footnote
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in Bryan's "Cress of Gold" speech, and in the utterances of many
another lost cause. Still, this spirit wp.s so manifest in the Pro-
gressive Convention of 1912 as to impress itself strongly upon
those who were present. Probably this spirit of idealism, taken
with the platform of the Party, did more than anything else to at-
tract to the ranks many social workers, thinkers, political and so
cial reformers, and other idealists who were seeking for the con-
crete realization of some of their ideals.
The Platform itself is so important, and it raises so many
special questions and problems that the discussion of it is reserv
ed for a separate chapter.

CHAPTER VI.
THE PROGRESSIVE PLATFORM OF 1912.
The Text of the Platfprm.
It is Bomcwhat startling to learn that the Progreasive
Platform of 1913 presente a considerable problem off textual oriti-
oism. The text of a document so wellknown as a modern political
platform is usually definite and determinate, and not subject to
controversy.
Yet in a careful word-for-word comparison of eight copies
of "A Contract with the People* thif Progressive Platform of 1912,
it has been discovered that no two copies are exactly alike. One
might expect to find many variations in punctuation, capitalization,
paragraphing, etc. As a matter of fact, there are no less than
293 of such minor variations, (1) or an average of 41.9 for each of
the seven variamt copies (2),
Bat even thiB large number of minor variations is lost
sight of when the number and magnitude of the major variations are
discovered. None of the sevenvariant copies is without important
major variations, such omissions, changes in wording, re-ar-
rangement of the order of paragraphs, etc. Changes in wording are
(1) The total number is really considerably larger, 293 represents
the total number of paragraphs containing minor variations
from the Standard, in all the eight copies of the platform. But
one variant paragraph will often contain several separate
variations from the Standard. I believe it would be fair to
estimate such additional variations at not less than 100 to150 more,bringing the total of minor variations up to somethinglike 400, or an average of 57.1 for each variant copy.




obviouBly, typographical errors, eometimes they are variations of
real inportance. Four of the variant oopiee agree in an important
re-arrangement of the order of the paragraphs. Omissions vary
from one word to five paragraphs. No variant copy is free from im-
portant omissions; and over one of the omiteed paragraphs, a con-
siderable political controversy h^s arisen.
Let us examine the text of the Platform in detail. The
following eight copies of the platform of 1913 have been used for
comparison*
Copies Examined. (1)
1. Chicago Daily - Tribune, August 8, 1912, p. 3
2. Chicago Record - Herald, August 8, 1912, p. 3
3. Payne, Birth of the New Party, p. 303 ff.
4. Stanwood, History of the Presidency, 1897-1909, p. 281 ff.
5. "A Contract with the People* - Platforn of the Progressive
Party, adopted at its First Hational Convention Progress-
ive Hational Committee, Forty-second Street Building, New
York City (pamphlet),
6. New York Evening Post, "Party Platforms and Conventions", 1912
(peuEphlet)
.
7. World Almanac, 1916, p. 779 n , j
8. "A Contract with the People"- Platform of the Progressive Party
adopted at its First National Convention ..... Progressive
National Committee, Manhattan Hotel^ New York City (pamphlet)
(1) The attempt has been made to number these copies in something
like chronological order, as far as that can be determined.
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It is manifestly Impossible to examine anything like all
the jwttllcations containing the platform; but it is believed that
this selection is fairly representative. Two of these (los, 5 and
8) are official publications of the Progressive Party; one (Payne)
is a sort of unofficial Progressive campaign textbook; one (stan-
wood) is a standard accepted work in the field of political
Science; two (Noa, 1 and 3) are newspaper copies published in the
city and at the time of the Progressive Convention; one (No. 6) is
a newspaper pamphlet summarizing the platforms, etc. of the cam-
paign; and one (the World Almanac) is a popularly accepted annual
handbook of refereaoe. (1)
Selection of Standard Copy.
Of these eight copies examined, two were published by
the Progressive Party itself; so one of these may fairly be accept-
ed as the Standsurd. The principal difference in the title of these
two copies is the place of publication. Each is published by the
Progressive National Ooraraittee; but on Ho, 5 the place is given as
(1) The Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1912 does not contain the
Progressive Platform. The Democratic Text-Book, 1913 con-
tains the material of the "Third Term Platforis,* but not in
such form that it can readily or profitably be analyzed for
purposes of textual criticism, since much of the platform
is placed in parallel columns with the other two platforms,
under topics instead of in regular order; and the rest of the
platform is grouped under "Additional Third- Term Planks."
Bryans'a Table of Two Conventions contains the "Platform of
the Progressive Party", but the text is much abridged, omiss-
ions being indicated by asterisks. Under such circumstances,
the copy is not of much value for textual comparison, though
even a cursory examination shows that the arrangement of the
paragraphs, at least, does not correspond with the Standard.
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"llajihattan Hotel, New York City", while on No. 8 it Is "Forty-
eoond Street Building, New York City". No. 5 was published before
the election of 1913, for juat above the place of publication there
appears in blackface italics the paragraph; "If you want these thing
done ratify this contract on November 5, by casting your vote for
Roosevelt and Johnson and the Progressive I*arty Candidates".
No. 8, published from the Forty-second Street Building,
was not published until after the election of 1912; for the Pro-
gressive National Oommittee did not move to the Forty -second St.
Building, until the spring of 1913. (1).
The text of No. 5 and No. 8 is precisely the same, save
that No. 5 omits the two sentences which appear as paragraph 40 in
No. 8. This is the anti-trust plank over whose omission the La-
Follette platform controversy arose.
(l) " the Progressive Party had its headquarters at Hotel
Manhattan in 1913 prior to moving to the 42nd Street Building,
being with us (Hotel Manhattan) from July 1913 to March 1913."
Letter to the writer, from Hotel Manhattan, J.E. Barrett,
Asst. Manager, March 7, 1917. "AH the information that I was
able to obtain relative to the Progressive Party is that they
had a lease with us in the Forty Second Street Buildinc' from
the first of May, 1913 to April 30th, 1916." Letter to the
writer, from Cross & Brown Co., Real Estate and Insurance,
18 East 41st Street, New York, March 6, 1917. I am unable to
make out the signature of the gentleman by whom the letter was
written. Hearty thanks are due both to the Hotel Manhattan




No. 8 may be aooept«d as the Standard Text of the Platform
for these reasons:
1. It is the most oomprehenaive text of the platform. The other
rersions all have omissions, but not one has any important or con-
siderable addition to No. 8.
3. As explained in the discussion of the LaFollette controversy
(pp.l08*-lll) * No. 8, with its retention of paragraph 40, seems to
be the deliberately and finally chosen form of the text, approved
by the Progressive Party.
Textual Analysis of the Variant Versions.
For purposes of comparison, we have numbered each paura-
graph of No. 8. The following textual analysis and comparison of
the seven variant versions with No, 8, the Standard, shows the ar-
rangement and major variations in the seven variant versions of
the platform.
The following is the key to the Analysis:
1. The paragraph numbers refer, invariably, to the paragraph num-
bers i n the Standard . If paragraph 75 in a variant is opposite
paragraph 17 in the Standard, it means that in the variant version
the paragraph numbered 75 in the Standard follows directly the
paragraph numbered 16 in the Standard.
3. A blank space in a variant indicates that the paragraph of the
variant corresponds with the paragraph of the Standard in text.
5. A space marked "M" in the variauit indicates that the paragraph
of the variant contains minor variations only, from the Standard.
4. A reference to a footnote denotes a major variation which is
given in the footnote.
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Textual Analysis of Platform.
No. 8 No. 7 No. 6 No. 5 No. 4 No. 3 No, 3 No, 1
1 M U M M 1 M
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No. 5 No. 4 No. 3 No. 2 No. 1
100 100 M 100 M 100
101(35)101 M 101 M 101 M
103 M 103 102 M 102
103 M 103 M 103 103 U
104 M 104 M 104 M 104
105 M 105 M 105 U 105 M
108 M 106 M 106 M 106 M
Notes on Textual Analyeis.
NOTE PARAGRAPH LINE
(1) 6 6-7 No. 4 reada "alleging* for "acknowledging J-
apparently a typographical error.
(3) 11 1 Ho8. 1, 3, and 6 insert "National"before
"Progressive," No. 4 using the capital, Nos.l,
and 6 using the small initial letter.
(3) 13 3 No. 4 has "adapt" for "adopt", - another
evidence of hasty proof reading.
(4) 14 2 No, 4 inserts "it was" between "if" and
"found".
(5) Through paragraph 16, the arrangement of all
the versions has been identical. With para-
graph 17 begins the re-arrangement of paragraphs
by Hos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(6) 17 2 Nos, 1 and 3 read "enlarged" for "enlight-
ened".
(7) 21 2 Hos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 read "living wage" for
"living scale.
"
(8) 22 1 The same "aurrangement variants" insert "gen-
eral" before "prohibition".
(9) 50 5 Nos, 1, 5, 4, and 7 omit the modifying words
"tend to", strengthening the assertion of
the plank.
(10) 33 5 No. 4 omits "affairs,"
(11) 33 6 No, 4 omits "that" before "control."




(13) 35 6 No. 4 changes tha eenaa by aubstituting th«
adjdotivd "public" for the noun "publicity",
(14) 35 8 No8. 3 and 4 read "ill" for "evils,"
(15) 36 4-5 No. 4 omita the qualifying clause, "or of such
of them as are of public importance."
(IS) 87 11 Hos. 1, 2, and 3 omit the words "of appropriate
action for the improvement", reading instead
"the promotion of vital statiatice."
(17) 37 3 No8. 2 and 7 read "corporate" for "corporation."
(18) 43 Nos. 2, 5, amd 4 have this paragraph shortened
to about half of that in the Standard. The
paragraph in the Standard is as follows; the
underlined words are omitted by Nos. 3, 3 and 4:
9 It is imperative to the welfare of our people
that we enlarge and extend our foreign commerce.
He are pre-eminently fitted to do this because
as a people we have developed high ski ll in the
art of manufacturing; our business men are
strong executives, strong organizers. In every
way possible our Federal Government should co-
operate in this important matter.
Any one who has had opportunity to
study and observe first hand Germany's course
in this respect must realize that their policy
of co-operation between Government and business
has in comparatively few years made them a lead-
ing competitor for the commerce of the world.
It should be remembered that they ars doing this
on a national scale amd with large units of
business, while the Democrats would have us be-
lieve that we should do i t with small "units of
business, which would be controlled, not by the
National Government, but by forty -nine conflict-
ing sovereignties. Such a policy is ut terly
out of keeping with the progress of the times
and gives our great commercial rivals in Europe
hungry for international markets- golden
opportunities of which they" are rapidly taking
advantage.






(30) 57 4 Nob. 1, 2. 3 and 4 substltutd "hindrancds
rules", for "needlesn restrictions"
(31) 62 3-4 No. 5 OBiita one lins— obvioufllv a. miflnrint-
(22) 71 3 No. 7 reads "open" for "opened".
(23) 65 4 Both No. 1 and No. 2 make the ludicrous
substitute "headquarters" for "headwaters".
(24) 65 9 No. 4 omits "by river", words which seem
rather necessary to the sense.
(35) 101 7 No. 4 substitutes for "support of" the
equivalent words, "to support."
The above Textual Analysis reveals an extraordinary amount of
variation in the readings of the eight copies of the platform. How-
ever, some of the main lines of this variation may readily be
traced.
The most glaring departure from the Standard is the radical re-
arrangement of paragraphs. Four of the copies (Stanwood, Payne, the
Tribune
.
and the Herald) differ from the Standard in paragraph order;
but these four variants correspond _with .each other in paragraph or-
der, each having the following arrangement, with the orciseions noted
below: Paragraphs 1-16, 75-85, 17-31, (1) 84-86, 50^52, 87, 32-40,
88-89, 53-55, 41-42, (2) 56-61, 90, 70-74, 62-69, 45-49, 91-106.
(1) No. 4, Standwood omits Paragraphs 27-31. See on p. 100
(2) No. 1, Tribune omits paragraph 42.
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It is significant that all of these arrangeir.ent variants were
published soon after the adoption of the Platform. The Tribune and
Herald published the text of the Platform the morning after its
adoption. Payne's book: is a tawdry, designedly popular, semi-offic-
ial "campaign book", published for use in the campaign of 1912, and
probably printed within a few weeks after the Progressive Convention.
Professor Stanwood also seized upon one of the earliest copies
available, as he had been delaying the publication of his book to
include the Progressive Platform. (1)
At least three of the arrangement -variants show signs of
hurried composition. No. 4 Stanwood, has many slight variations of
words and phrases which may have been due to hasty proof-reading
(see notes above). Indeed, it is probable that a proof-reader's
error is responsible for the entire omission by Stanwood of para-
(1) "I am sorry that I can give you no information of value with
reference to the Progressive platform of 1912. I cannot even
tell you whence I obtained the copy I used. I am only sure
that I took the most authentic copy available at the time. The
case four years ago was similar to that at the present time.
This year I am issuing — in a week or two, I expect, — a
new edition, covering the election of 1912. I had to delay
until after the Prohibition convention, in order to have all
the platforms. It was so four years ago. As soon as the Pro-
gressive convention adjourned I inserted the nominations and
the platform at the end of the appendix and the book was
quickly printed. Of course no controversy had arisen then
about the text." Letter to the writer from Prof. Edward Stan-
wood, The Mumbles, Squirrel Island, Maine, Sept. 7, 1916.
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graphs 37, 38, 39, 30, 31, for Stanwood 1» in other rsBpecte In
general agreement with the other arrangement-variants. More illunr-
inating still is the agreement between the Tribun e and Herald in the
variation shown in note 33 above, reading, in paragraph 65 (dealing
with the development of waterways) the phrase "water storage at the
headquartered instead of the Standard reading, "water storage at the
headwaters." The substitution ie of course, a laughable misprint;
but does not the very obvious character of the error make it clear
that the Tribune and Herald (which were simultaneously published,
Bo that one could not have copied from the other) drew their copies
from a coiBmon source which itself contained the incorrect reading^
There is not sufficient evidence to be sure of our conclusions,
but it seems reasonable to suppose that, in regard to the arrange-
ment-variants, one of the two following alternatives is true;
1. The less likely supposition is that the Standard arrangement
was the original arrangement of paragraphs, but that some early
copy of the platform contained the variant arrangement, and that this
was widely copied as the authentic text. Probably this variant-
arrangement source was given out ajs official or semi-official, since
the newspapers would be likely to secure the text direct from some
member or committee of the Convention. In this case we should have
to suppose that the separate paragraphs or the typewritten sheets
of some early copy of the platform were accidentally shuffled, pro-
ducing the variant arrangement, and so this wrong order has been
copied.
3. The more probable supposition is that the paragraph order of
the four arrangement-variants was the or
i
fifial, order of the platform .

107
as it was adopted in th« Convention; but that afterwards the ar-
rangement was revised, for official publication, and that this
revised order is the one found in the Standard. Such a revision
by a oommittee or group of Progressive leaders would, of course, be
an unjustifiable usurpation of authority; but in the light of the
LaFollette controversy, discussed in the following pages, it seems
quite poBSible that some STXh thing may have happened.
The copies of the Platform which conform to the Standard in
arrEmgement are in general the later or more carefully edited copies,
Ho. 5 though a campaign document, was carefully prepared. It was
probably intended for a large edition and for wide distribution as
the official "campaign copy* of the platform. No. 8, the Standard,
is a revised reprint of Ro. 5, issued after the caimpaign of 1913.
Ho 6, the pamphlet of the New York Evening Post was p^i^iished dur-
ing the campaign, but it shows rather distinct signs of careful
and unhurried publication. The copy in the World,Almanac for 1916,
while probably taken from previous issues of the Almanac, was pub-
lished after the campaign, and was able to receive careful editing.
The Standard, No. 5, the Evening Post, and the World, show
close agreement, in general, and are probably all taken from the
unknown predecessor of No. 5, the deliberately and carefully edited
copy of the platform published as official during the campaign. No.
5 and the Evening Post are identical, except for minor variations,
rurthermore, No. 7, the World Almanac, agrees with Ro. 5 and the
Evening Post except for minor variations and for two major variations
noted in notes 23 and 9. Note 32 is of little importance; the
World reads "open" for "opened" which does not change the sense, and
which is scarcely more than a slight inaccuracy in proof-reading.
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Hot© 9 it less intelligible, for here the World agrees with the
Tribune, Payne and Stanwood in omitting the words "tend to" before
the words "remove the artificial causes."
"Paragraph 40"
The most striking fact about the Tribune, Evening Post and
lorId is that they agree with each other and differ with the Stan^ird
in the omission of paragraph 40. This paragraph is an "anti-trust"
plank, containing a declaration in favor of "strengthening the
Sherman law".
Shortly after the close of the campaign of 1912, the omission
of paragraph 40 from copies of the platform was brought to light;
and the matter was given as much publicity as possible by Senator
lAFollotto, as a political opponent of Col. Roosevelt and of the Pro-
gressive PSLTty.
In LaFollette's Weekly for Dec, 7, 1913, (1), Mr. Macarthy of
the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau presented his evidence
oonoerning the "missing plank", as follows: Macarthy had been pre-
sent at the meeting of the Progressive Committee on Resolution; and
he declared that paragraph 40 was unanimously passed by the Com-
mittee; that it was included in the typewritten copies given to the
Convention; and that it was adopted by the Convention. Macarthy
said that paragraph 40 appeared in the early edition of the Chicago
Tribune (2) but that on the night of August 7, Mr. O.K. Davis (later
the Secretary of the Progressive National Committee) went to the
(1) LaFollette'a Weekly, Dec. 7, 1913, p 3, 4-6, 12-14.
;2) As a matter of fact, our Textual Analysis shows that it appeared
also in the Record-Herald.
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Aisooiated Press office and cut out the "emti-truet • plank, re-
placlnia^ it with a "pro-truet" plank (1) taken verbatim from Rooee-
Yelt»8 Confession of Faith" speech of August 12. (3)
It is interesting to note just here that the copy of the
Tribune used in this study, which contains paragraph 40, does in
fact, omit paragraph 42 entirely; and also that the Record-He rald
.
Stanwood, and Payne have a very much shortened form of paragraph
43. (3) Ho recognition nor explanation of this short form of para-
graph 42 appears to have been printed.
In the next issue of his paper after the publication of
Macarthy*8 statement, (4) LaFollette presented further testimony
by a certain Chae. K. Lush, who said that he actually saw Davis
clip from a magazine the "pro-trust" paragraph from Roosevelt's
speech, paste or pin it on a sheet of paper, and take it to the Press
office. There Lush concludes it was "wired out as an insert along
with the Davis message killing the Sherman law plank...., I remember
when I saw the clipping I thought it very coarse work. Fot it is
in itself proof that no such plank was ever adopted by the committee
(1) Paragraph 42, as in the Standard.
(3) pp. 31-33, pamphlet, "Theodore Roosevelt's Confession of Faith."
It agrees verbatim with the plank, save for the omission of
one word which is not important.
(3) cf. p. 103
(4) LaFollette '6 Weekly 3, Dec. 14, 1912, p. 3.
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on resolutions But perhaps Davis wil} tell where he got it."
LaFollette's persistence in advertising what he regarded as a
•platform scandal* was not helpful to the Progressive cause, and
at a conference of Progressive leaders, held in Chicago in December
1912, the matter was taken up for discussion. LaFollette dryly
recorded that Roosevelt talked with Macarthy; (1) that Roosevelt
made a speech favoring the omitted plank; and finally that the lead-
ers had agreed to "let the troublesome plank go back into the plat-
form'now for then* •
. LaFollette also quoted Davis as saying that
the "anti-trust* plank was adopted by the Resolutions Committee,
but that when Dixon and Roosevelt objected, it went back to the
Committee and was stricken out. It was then accidentally read in
the Convention, and so adopted; but afterwards some leaders dis-
covered the mistake and had this matter stricken out and the new
plank inserted.
LaFollette evidently believed that the whole matter is a sin-
ister affair and that it was purposely hushed up. He closed the
discussion with two trenchant questions, which yet remain to be ans-
wered: First, Who were the "some leaders" for whom Davis acted?
Second, Ifhy did the Chicago conference, meeting in December, leave
the "inserted" plank in the platform?
In the next issue of LaFollette'e Weekly, (2) LaFollette replied
to somewhat tardy Progressive denials of the facts alleged by
(1) LaFollette»8 Weekly Dec. 21, 1912, pp. 3-4
(2) LaFollette»8 Weekly IV. No. 52, 3, Dec. 28, 1912.
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UFollette. Nothing conclueiYe was established by either side, but
LaFollette appears to have the better of the argunent. Altogether,
the affair does not reflect any credit upon the Progressive Party.
A suspicion of unscrupulous trickery hangs over the whole transactior]
and arouses more critical wonder as to the textual variations of the
copies of the Platform.
At any rate, the Chicago Conference of December 1913 apparently
decided that both paragraph 40 and paragraph 42 (in its longer form)
should be included in the canon of the platform. Hence, copy No. 8,
published from the Forty Second Street Building in 1913, contains
the deliberately approved text of the Progressive Platform of 1912,
and may properly be accepted as the textual Standard.
The Contents of the Platform
Granting that the Standard text of the Platform is established,
what is the significance of its planks? In what did the Progressive
Party of 1912 affirm its belief?
The Platform of 1912, more than any other one thing, identified
the Progressive Party as an integral part of the great contemporary
Bovement toward the attainment of practical Democracy. The follow-
ing outline shows briefly the contents of the platform. The headings
(except the first one) are those used in the Standard copy; and the
numbers refer to the paragraphs of the Standard. In this outline
an asterisk has been placed before each paragraph which contains an
open or readily implied committal to the cause of securing more
Practical Democracy. (1)




Declaration of Principles of the Progressive Party.
I. (IntrodLxction)
• 1 Conscience of the people has created new party- dedicated
to maintain government of, by,and for the people.
• 3 People are maeters of their constitution.
* 3 Country belongs to the people and should be used and
developed for general interest.
4 "It is time to set the public welfare in the first place."
II. The Old Parties
5 Parties exist to serve the people
6 Both of these old parties have turned aside from their
tasks. Irresponsible "invisible government", rules.
• 7 "Dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and
corrupt politics".
* 8 New party necessary to express will of the people.
* 9 New party offers itself "as the instrument of the people"
III. A Covenant with the People
10 "This declaration is our covenant with the people"
IV. The Rule of the People
* 11 "Government by a self-controlled democracy expressing its
will through representatives of the people
"i "insure the
representative character of the government."
13 Direct Government:
Direct primaries for nomination of state and national
officers.
Nation-wide preferential presidential primaries




V. Amendment of Constitiition
13 Easier method of amending Constitution, "to adopt it
progresaively to the changing needs of the people"
VI. Nation and State
* 14 National jurisdiction over inter-state problems
15 Intolerable for states to "become competing commercial
agencies"
* 16 Democrats surchaic in insistence on states' rights
VII. Social emd Industrial Justice
* 17 Supreme duty of nation is "the conservation of human re-
sources through an enlightened measure of social and in-
dustrial justice." Progressive Party pledges itself to
work for
:




* 19 Minimum industrial safety and health Bteindards
* 20 Prohibition of child labor
* 31 Minimum wage for working women
* 33 Limitation of hours of work for women and children
* 23 "One day's rest in seven for all wage-workers*
* 24 Eight-hour day in continuous twenty-four-hour in-
dustries
* 35 Abolition of convict labor
* 26 Publicity of conditions of labor
* 27 Compensation for "death by industrial accidents and
injury and trade diseases" - transfer burden of lost
earnings "to the industry and thus to the community
T
* 28 Social insurance
* 29 "Lifting the last load of illiteracy", encouragement
of industrial education.
* 30 Industrial research laboratories; apply science to "tte
service of American producers"
* 31 Labor organization
VIII. Business
* 32 Secure "large measure of general prosperity"
* 33 Test of true prosperity, benefits conferred on all;
test of corporate efficiency, ability to serve the
public
* 34 "Strong national regulation of interstate corporations"
* 35 Eradicate abuses of big business
* 36 Federal Commission to supervise interstate industrial
corporations
* 37 Duties of such oommiasionj enforce publicity; attack
unfair competition, false capitalization, special
privilege; vigilsuice, ate,
* 38 Would benefit businasa
,
* 39 And free it from confusion and uncertainty
* 40 Strengthen the Sherman law
IX. Commercial Development
* 41 Government "co-operate with manufacturers and pro-
ducers in extending our foreign commerce"
* 42 National Government must co-operate with business, as
Germamy had done, to extend foreign commerce
^. Tariff
* 43 Protective tariff
44 "Benefit of any tariff should be disclosed in the
pay envelope of the laborer"
45 Tariff reviaion downward- present tariff unjust to
people
46 Non-partisan scientific tariff commission,
47 With adequate power. Immediate reduction of "schedule
generally recognized as exceaaive"
48 Payne -Aldrich bill unjust to the people
49 Repeal Canadian reciprocity act
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XI. High Cost of Living
50 Due to natural and artificial causes, Ueaeuraa here
proposed will tend to remove artificial causes
51 Other causes will remain; which
53 Must be remedied by full information and effective
government supervision
XII. Currency
53 Improve currency system
54 Govsrnement control of currency- protect from special
interests
55 Oppose Aldrich Bill as placing currency and credit
system in private hands
XIII. Conservation
56 Conservation of natural resouroos
57 Agricultural lands remain open to genuine settler
58 Public control of remaining natural resources
59 Government retain control over natural resources
60 Require reasonable compensation to public for water-
power rights hereafter granted
61 Lease public grazing lands under equitable provisions
XIV. Waterways
63 Rivers natural arteries of trade
63 Develop our rivers, especially Mississippi
64 Immediate plan of waterway development
65 Benefits of such action
66 Use experience and organization of Psmama Canal for
this purpose
XV. Panama Canal
67 Built and paid for by American- use for their benefit
63 Break transportation monopoly of trans-continental rail-
roads. No tolls for American ships,
69 Develop co-operation with Latin-American nations
XVI. Alaska
70 natural resources of Alaska open to development, under
ownership of U.S.
71 No grants except under homestead law
73 Benefits of such a policy
73 Government prevention of transportation extortion or
monopoly
74 Territorial government for Alaska
XVII. Equal Suffrage
75 "Equal suffrage to men and women alike*
XVIII. Corrupt Practices
76 Limitation on and publicity of campaign contributions
and expenditures
XIX. Publicity and Public Service
77 Registration of lobbyists; public committee hearings,




* 78 Restriot power of courts ao that people "determine fun-
damental queetiona of aooial welfare and public policy"
79 Referendum on judicial dtoiaione holding law uncon-
stitutional, when passed under police power of state
80 Decision of supreme court of state declaring state act
unoonstitutional because of violation of federal con-
stitution to be subject to review by United Statea Supreme
Court
XII. Administration of Justice
* 81 Reforn of legal procedure amd judicial methods, to se-
sure better administration of justice
* 83 No issuance of special injunctions in labor disputes
85 Contempt cases in labor disputes subject to trial by
jury
XXII. Department of Labor
* 84 Establish national Department of Labor
XXIII. Country Life
* 85 Development smd prosperity of country life important
86 Develop agriculture and country welfare
XXIY. Health
* 87 Unified national health service
XXV. Patents
* 88 "Make it impossible for patents to be suppressed or
used against the public welfire"
XXVI. Interstate Commerce Commission
89 Empower Commission to value physical property of rail-
roads. Abolish Commerce Court.
XXVII. Good Roads
90 Extend good roads amd rural free delivery
XXVIII. Inheritance and Income Tax
91 Graduated inheritajioe tax
93 Income tax, by constitutional amendment
XXIX. Peace and National Defense
* 93 Deplore warfare; attempt to substitute arbitration, etc.
94 Favor international agreement for limitation of navies.
Pending such agreement, continue present policy, two
new battleships a year
XXX. Treaty Rights
* 95 "Protect American citizenship, in treaties and otherwise.




96 "Larger share of American opportunity" to the immigrant
97 Denounce neglect of immigrants
98 Governmental action to aid immigrants
XXXII. Pensions
99 "Wise and just policy" of pensions. Approve Southern
state pensions to ex-^onf ederates
XXXIII. Parcel Post
100 Create parcel post
XXXIV. Civil Service
101 Condemn use of patronage violations of civil service law
by (Taft) administration
102 "Enforcement of the civil service act in letter and
spirit"; extension of civil service; equitable provisions
for retirement; "continuous service during good behavior
and efficiency*
XXXV. Government Business Organization
103 Readjustment of government business methods, to secure
economy and efficiency
XXXVI. Government Supervision over Investments
104 People swindled through worthless investments
105 Governmental supervision over investments
XXXVI I . Cone lus ion
106 "On these principles and on the recognized desirability
of uniting the Progressive forces of the nation into
an organization which shall unequivocally represent the
Progressivs spirit and policy we appeal for the support
of all American citizens, without regard to previous
political affiliations."
Several things are to be noted about this platform. In the
first place, the "contract with the People" is, in the main, clear-
cut and definite
.
There are fewer meaningless generalities and l
double faced planks and less ambiguity than in most recent American
party platforms, (1)
(1) "Never before had an important political party taken up in itsplatform so many vital issues in such a definite way". DeWitt
Progressive Movement, 86. / xwu.
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In the eeoond plaoa, the platform is actually in aocord with
the tendency toward Praotioal Demooraoy. (1) We have marked 63
out of 106 paragraphs, or 59^ of the whole number, as expressing,
in our judgment, committal to the cause of Praotioal Democracy. The
Pregrossive Party was the first large party to declare openly for
Women Suffrage. Much of the platform deals with the necessity of
insuring the rule of "the people", even though this term is nowhere
defined. The methods auid devices of direct government" are approv-
ed; and other new measxxres are proposed with the ostensible pur-
pose of proteoting or aiding the people in general or such laurge
groups as the farmers and the laborers (2).
But the platform is nowhere more unique and significant than
in the emphasis which it lays upon" social and industrial justice."
Political demooraoy, in the fullest sense, is dependent upon a
democratic organization of society and industry; and the Progressive
"social welfare" planks marked a new recognition of the overwhelm-
ing need of social reform and social democracy.
(1) Cf. Survey 7XXVI: 504(June 17, 1916.) "The common denominators
of the party as an organic undertaking were three- a de-
termination to get a greater measure of public control in the
hands of the people, aui ideal to make America again a land
of opportunity for a growing industrial generation^ and faith
and enthusiasa in a leader "
(3) It is not contended here that all these proposals of the
platform are either necessary or advisable; but merely that




In the pioneering days of early Ineurgenoy, LaFollotte and
his colleagues had neoee3arily fought almost entirely for politloal
demooraoy. It remained for the Progreaaive Party to be the firat
important political party to exalt the ideal and magnify the
neceasity of social democracy; and this new social vision is one
of the chief contributions of the Progressive Party to the great
movement toward Practical Democracy.
The question has often been asked: "la the Progressive Party
Socialistic?" The auiswer depends largely upon one's definition of
Socialism. Theoretically, the American Socialist Party still
professes belief in most of the Marxian dogmas of class warfare,
the economic interpretation of history, and the inexorable, re-
placement of capitalism by socialism. (1) Back of all these theo-
ries lies the real devotion of the Socialists to the ideal of the
"Co-operative Commonwealth", and their inflexible opposition to
the present "capitalistic" organization of society. With this, the
Progressives have nothing in common. The Progreaaive Party ad-
vocates reform of the present industrial system; the Socialist Party
demands the abolition of the present system. The Progressives be-
lieve in the present system, as a whole, but they wish to reform
it; the Socialists do not believe in the present system and they
wish to revolutionize it.




Bat in the actual struggles of political campaigns, the
Socialists have adopted a "working programme" of ooHeotive owner-
ship, conservation, auid other industrial and political demands;
though it is frankly stated that all "such measures of relief as
we may be able to force from capitalism are but a preparation of the
workers to seize the whole powers of government, in order that they
may thereby lay hold of the whole system of socialized industry and
thus come to their rightful inheritance.* (1)
Many of the demands of this Socialist working programme are
identical with or very similar to planks of the Progressive Plat-
form; for instamce, the expressions regarding conservation, a weekly
rest day for all workers, the abolition of child labor, the abolition
of convict labor, minimum waje, income and inheritance taxes, the
initiative, referendum and recall, amendment of the Constitution,
strengthening of a national health service, and the creation of a
Department of Labor.
Thus in their practical working programmes, the Progressives
and Socialists have so much in common that it has been rightly said
that "the most extreme of these (larger) parties, the Progressive,
is not very different from the Socialist party in many of its be-
liefs. Radical Progressives and conservative Socialists, therefore,
could almost meet on common ground." (2)
(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement 97-98.




THE ELECnOlI 01^ 1912 AUD Ai^TiilHV/ARDS
.
After t'.ie prolonged ^.nd exciting battles over the nom-
inations, the campaign of 1912 settled down into comparative quiet-
ness. After all, there v/as no one great paramount issue to stir men
deeply. Indeed, in the unusual three-cornered fight for the election,
it is difficult to understand just what were the principal issues.
Probably the trusts received the greatest amount of discussion, with
the tariff coming in for a good share, while other governmental
proposals received varying degrees of attention.
As for the Progressive Party, its greatest iSLue was
its own existence. The manner of its formation challenged men to
think and Judge, to approve or condemn. Aside from this, b^ome of the
more radical planks,-- such as the one on Woman Suffrage, on the
recall of judicial decisions, and on direct goverment,-- received
considerable debate.
President Taft was obviously the defender of conser-
vatism; 7/ilson was yet untried, but seemed to be promisingly prog -
ressive;the Progressive Party was the avowed champion of Practical
Democracy, but men's attitude to?/ards it was modified favorably or
unfavorably by the conditions of its birth and by its leadership.
The most startling incident of the campaign nearly put a tragic end
to tne career of the Progressive candidate. At Milwauriee, an insane
nan fired upon Col. Hoosevelt, intending to assassinate him. The
wound, however, proved not to be serious; and Col. iioosevelt was soon




Democratic 6 293 019
Progressive 4 119 507
Republican 3 484 221
Socialist 901 875
Prohibitionist 207 728
Socialist Labor 29 259
The Election Of 1912
.
At the election in iJoveraber, Woodrow Wilson was elected
President by a plurality of 2,2^.5,289
. The Progressive Party ran
gecond, securing a popular vote of over 4,000,000 and an electoral
vote of 88, as sh^wn by the following table: (1)




Heavy as the Progressive vote was, the Party did not
succeed in appealing equally to progressive men of all parties
. By
far, the great bulk of the Progressive vote undoubtedly came from
former Republicans. "Taffs vote in 1908 had been 7,678,908; that
of Roosevelt and Taft combined in 1912 amounted to very nearly the
saffie,7,604,46S.(2) iiany Republicans of Progressive sentiments, includ-
ing La Pollette, Cum:i.ins, Hadley, Borah, and others, refused to enter
the new party. Some believed that a new party was inexpedient, and
that the victory of progressivism could best be won within Republic-
an lines. Others bowed to tne fetish of party regularity and shrank
from being classed as bolters.
(1) World Almanac 1916, 727
(2) De Witt; Progressive laovement 86
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Still others sympathized witli the fundamental aims of
the Progressive Party, but remained out of it because of personal
distrust or dislike of Hoosevelt. Of these progres;.ive Itepublicans
who refused to enter the irogrestivo Party, some enthusiastically
supported Taft and others declared for Wilson. Other Republicans,
of course, voted for Wilson on the stren£;fe. of his record and per-
sonality; and there were others v;ho favored Taft, but feeling that
Taft's cause was hopless. voted for .Vilson in order to insure the
defeat of Roosevelt.
On the other hand, lioosevelt's personality drew some
votes which would not otherwise have gone to the Progressives. How-
ever, the extent of Roosevell^s popularity and the drawing power of
his personality was probably overestimated both by himself and by
his friends; for apparently be drew but few men away from the
Democratic ranks. Wilson's vote in 1912 was only 116.085 less than
the Democratic vote for Bryan in 1908, One writer sug,.ests th£-t the
Progressive Party probably oost Socialism a good many votes; (i)
but even so. the Socialists practically doubled their vote of four
years before
.
In the presidential election, the Progressives carried
the states of Michigan. Liinnesota. Pennsylvania. South Dakota, and
Washington, splitting the victory with the Democrats in California.
(1) De V/itt. Progressive Movement 87
(2) ivorld Almanac 1916. 726
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in addition to T^his, the Jrogrec. ives elected 18 members of Con^^ress
(1), and they elected also a number of state tickets.
After the election, the irogressives be^jan to lay their
plans to insure the permanency of the party.
"After that campaign.... which cut the Republican hold down to two
states and put the minority v/ing of a minority party in power at
V/ashington. the movement left competent forces in the saddle in cer-
tain states a small congressional group 7;hich dwindled in tne
off
-
year elections, a rrogrescive Service to push the ideas the
party stood for (which was elaborately schemed but briefly died);
and a central party organization which lacked coherence, which econ-
omically never stood on its own legs, the divergent elements of which
•were held togetner by a single welding force, i^. Hoosevelt's per-
sonality." (2)
At a national conference of Progrescive leaders, held in
Chicago on jecember luth, 1912, Roosevelt emphasized that there must
"no fusion-" with the Republicans. (Z) He reiterated this statement
a month later, in reply to a plan of amalgamation proposed by ij^rank
.-unsey
.
Ihe Republicans continued to discuss the possibility of a
merger, but without awakening rruch enthusiasm among the Progressives.
"It is plain." said Beveridge in June 1915, " that our merger- pro-
moting friends have undertaken an impossible task. "(4)
(1) World Almanac 1916, 490
(2) Survey, ZXXVI. 504 i June 17, 1916)
(5) Rev. Revs.v 47: 19-20, 34 (Jan. 1915)
(4) Beveridge, Albert J.- The Progressive- Republican Mer-ver 16.
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Kecognizing that the Progressives were in earnest, the
Hepublicans at length undertook a "counter-reformation." m Uec-
ember 1915, the Republicnn national Committee laid plans for a re-
apportionment Of delegates to the national convention, eliminating
ir-ore than 80 Southern delegates, and basing the apportionment partly
on voting strength; and the adoption of this plan was announced on
October Ecth, 1914.(1)
In the congressional elections of 1914, the progressives
Flayed a small part. They elected but seven congressmen, and in
general, ran behind the Democrats and Republicans.
About this time foreign affairs and military preparedness
began to loom large in politics. Col. Roosevelt threw himself into
the extreme wing of the preparedness advocates; "little was there-
after heard of such collaborators as Ulss Addams and Dean iiirchwey;
.... the elimination of V/ilson rather than the breaking of the boss-
es became the combative personal issue? (2) and the Progressive pro-
gram of 1912 was swallov/ed up in the new issues of "preparedness"
and "Americanism."
The Progressive Party movement subsided as rapidly as it
had arisen. Progressives receded from their former aloofness from
the Republicans and in both parties the talk of harmony continued to
increase
.
(1) Rev. Revs.v 50: 672 (Dec. 1914)
(2) Survey XZZYI, 504 (June 17th. 1916)
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A long practical step to this end was taken when both Jrogressives
and Hepublicans decided to hold their conventions at Chicago on June
7th. 1916. (1)
The conventions of 1916 saw the end of the Progressive
party as an important political party. The Progressives awl^vardly
prolonged their convention in an evident effort to give opportunity
for a merger; when this was not accomplished, they nominated Col.
Hoosevelt and John M. Parker of Louisiana.
The Hepublicans also attempted to secure harmony by nomi-
nating Charles i^van Hughes, who, as a Justice of the Supreme Court,
had been removed from the factional strife of the last fev; years.
Upon the nomination of Hughes (who was not allied to the
"Stand-patters." and who had a record of practical reform in IJew
York State). Hoosevelt gave notice of his determination to return
to the Republican Party. Consequently, he declined the Progressive
nomination, "conditionally." (2)
Or. June 26th, 1916, the progressive national Convention
accepted Col. Roosevelts declination, and adopted his recom^nendation
that the Progressive Party endorse Charles Ji. Hughes. Republican
candidate for President. (5) This act effectively closed the life
(1) Rev. Revs.v 53: 14S ( Peb . 1916)
(2) The conventions of 1916 are reviewed in Rev. Revs v 54'Z-IZ(July, 1916) .
(3) Rev. Revs, v 54: 153 f Aug. 1916). Two days later, Col .Rooseveltconferred with Llr. Hughes regarding campaign plans ;-id issuesthus emphasizing his "return" to the Republican Party
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Of the Progrescive Party. Ab inslgnlfioant minority of the .arty
protested against the merger, ana attempted to reconstruct the
shattered organization of the party (1 ) but they have had as little
practical importance as the last of the Populists, a decade earlier.
AS a vital force in .Imerioan politics, the .rogressive
party had just four years of life, from the suiamer of 191£ to the
sm..er of 1916. She Progressive Party of 191£ is now a memory; with
its removal from tae field of active politics, it is now possible
for men to look back and to seek to estimate the significance of
this remarkable political movement.
(1) call for a xmtional Convention of Progressives, to meet inSt. loms during April 12
-.14,
.
1917, is mentLned in theSt. Louis




THE MEAUIIJG Oij' TEE PRO GiffiSLIVE PARTY.
What is the meaning- of the Progressive Party of 1912?
V/hat is its significance, if it has any. as a political phenomenon
in contemporary American history?
To answer this question (as far as it can be answered at
this early day) is to summarize the immediate and ultimate causes
(1) which led to the formation of the Progressive Party, the reasons
for its lack of permanence, and the results of its existence.
The Causes of The Progressive Party
.
It is sufficiently obvious and equally unenlightening to
say that the immediate cause of the Progressive Party was the Rep-
ublican nomination campaign of 1912. The statement is true, but it
is too general to be of much value. However, two factors in the nom-
ination campaign can be picked out as having a definite part in
causing the formation of the Progressive Party at this particular
time
.
The first of these factors is the reaction of the Roosevelt
delegates against the Taft " steam-roller."
1) The ultimate causes are those things which would eventually
have brought about the formation of the Progressive Party: theimmediate causes are those things which carded its formation
at the J)articular time when it was formed-
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"As the Republican convention proceeded, the Roosevelt felt more and
nore indignantly that they v;ere being unfairly deprived of their
just dues. V/hen the Republican convention adjuurned, the Roosevelt
delegates cane together with a nearly unanimous desire for so..ne kind
of radical action. Most of them were in the frame of mind accept
the idea of a new party, which had already be, n proposed more than
once during the convention week.
Just at this point entered the other factor which v/as an
iniinediate cause of the formation of theProgressive Party. This
second factor was the personality of Col. Roosevelt. His prestige
and reputation were at stake, his ambition was aroused, and all his
love of a fight cried out against "quitting" the bati;le after what
he believed was an unfair action by his opponents. i\mbition and
pugnacity outweighed patience and foresight; and when the suggestion
of a third party was made by the over-wrought delegates, it was
translated into, acoion by Col. Roosevelt's readiness to become the
eader of the new party.
One of the best pieces of critical wi^iting during the
campaign of :;.912 '.vas a characterization of Boosevelt that appeared
in the Worldte V/ork for June 1912. (1) It fits in closely with what
we have already said: and it contains so much truth, so compactly
and aptly stated, th:-t it is v/orth quoting in full:-




- the foremost political pertjonality of
nse
his time, whose vigorous and dictatori-:] of the x^resldency gave the
office a new meanin5^ and gave the nation a new impulse; whose
prodisious success bred in him a prodigious impatience, and has
misled him into sacrificing the dignity of his position; willing to
risk defeat for great principles of social justice that are some-
what too vague for clear political formulation, hut so fierce in
their hold that they drive him into compromising pugnacities and
contradictions and associatio--s ; the idol of the impatiently active;
he is an impulse rather than a well-ordered force; a man of the most
varied knowledge and accomplishments, hut strangely lacking in
economic grasp; capable of mistaking his wishes for his principles;
the probable destroyer of his party in his zeal to lift it up; in-
capable of retirement and lacking the patience to harvest and to
use the great influence of his prodigious activities; if he should
become
-^resident again, why not still again? That is the rock that
he is in danger of, for he is going recklessly over uncharted waters.
The pity of it is that he is running at all. It was a great enough
violence to the real rule of the people that he dictated his own
successor in the Presidency. It would be somev/hat too dictatorial
if he should become successor to that successor."
The ultimate causes of the formation of the Progressive
Party are perhaps less obvious but they are more important than the
immediate causes.
The first of these is undoubtedly the contemporary social
tendency toward the attainrannt of Practical Democracy. It must never
be forgotten that Progressivism is merely one phase of this movement;

130
so the existence of the movement v/as one of the ultimate causes for
the organization o. a new party.
A second cause is found in the administrations of Presideit
.Roosevelt, when his vigorous leadership and skillful a-itation put
the people in a mood for new adventures in democracy. Tlirough the
achievements of his administrations. Roosevelt gained his hold upon
the people; and this unusual popularity made him available in 1912
for the leadership of the new party.
The third ultimate cause of rrogressivisn is Insurgency.
Under the leadership of la ii^ollette and his colleagues. Insurgency
continued the work of Hoosevelt in awakening the people and in
strengthening the popular demand for Practical Democracy; while at
the sajne time it gave form and definiteness to the movement by beg-
inning to define its aims and to formulate its policies. Logically
Insurgency was the forerunner of the Progressive movement of 1912.
One further cause may be mentioned: the conservatism of
President Taft
.
In the heat of reactionary opposition, the Insurgents
were welded to gether
.
The Standpat-ism of the Taft administration
put many people in a mood for a radical remedy, and made them dis-
gusted with the Republican majority, and ready to try even the ex-
periment of a new party.
The failure Of The Progressive Party
.
With all these reasons for existence, why did the Pro-
gressive rarty fail as a permanent political party? It must be real-
ized that we are speaking here of the failure of a party organization
As far as its essential cause (the fight for Practical Democracy)
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is concerned, Progressivism did not fail; but as an organized politi-
cal
,
arty it did fail to establish itself permanently. To understand
the meaning of Progressivism, we must try to discover the causes for
this failure.
In our study of previous ilmerican third parties, (1) it
was suggested that, a priori a third party was likely to became a
major party if it arose at a time when a new major party was needed,
if it was generated by a spontaneous common impulse, if it was based
upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vital problem, and if it
enjoyed able leadership. The ap,:lying of these tests to the Progress-
ive Party will help us to understand its failui-e. The Progressive
Platform of 191E vehemently asserted that a new major party was need-
ed; but an impartial judge would be likely to conclude the case "not
proven." At the very time of the Progressive convention, the pro-
gressive Democrats were in control of their party, and had nominated
a candidate for the presidency. And even within the Republican Party
great progressive gains had been made by La i'ollette and other In-
surgents, and even by Roosevelt himself, as Senator la ii'ollette
suggests, "In 1911 Roosevelt thought it would be a great calamity to
divide the Republican party. It v/as a good party then. The only
thing that made it so bad as to deserve being riven asunder was that
(1) cf
. Chapter I, especially pp. 15-E5
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it would not nominate him I'or a third term in 1912" (1)
It Is nut the part of efficiency to abandon a well-develop
ed party organization, with the traditions of ^ half century gather-
ed about it; and the progressives never conclusively proved that
the Hepublican rarty was useless as an agency to secure progress,
and that rrogressivistn therefore filled the need of a new major
party.
Again, the progressive Party was hardly created by a spon-
taneous
.
yomaon impulse. The method of its formation has already been
described. The reasoning Mid the choice of the leaders was. after
all, the determining factor; and the raising of the standard of Pro-
gressivism did not for a moment unite all the real progressives in
a coiamon party.
nor did tiie Progressives present a proposed solution to
any one vital problem. They outlined in their platform a suggestive
and helpful program of work, hut they had no paramount issue.
In the matter of leadership, the Progressives had, of
course, in Col. Hocsevelt, one of the foremost men In American poli-
tics. Yet it is none the less true that, under the circumstances,
they were handicapped as well as helpoi by xDose^elt's leadership, and
more especially by his candidacy. Hoosevelt was not the leader of
the already existing progressive movement which we have called In-
surgency; the real leaders were La J^ollette and Cummins and other
1) La Pollette, Autobiography 749

133
somewhat less prominent men. koreover. Roosevelt, in becoming a can-
didate, ouinbered himself with necessity of meeting the "third term"
criticism of his opponents. Besides this, Housevelt was probably not
the type of leader that was needed in 1912. The day of his most
effective political service was past; the new conditions required
not an intensified "average man" who could agitate and stir the
people, but a political prophet and a constructive statesman who
could voice the vague desires of the people, and who could transform
rational ideals into political realities. Roosevelt's candidacy meant
inevitable failure to unite all the progressive forces, even within
the Republican Party. Those who disliked and distrusted Roosevelt
would not enter "his " party. The candidacy of Roosevelt precluded
the possibility of an ideal alliance of all progressives which might
have commanded the working efficiency and the determination of
La Zollette, the broad knowledge and political insight of V/ilson,
the oratory and passionate conviction of Bryan, and the popular
appeal and personal ability of Roosevelt
.
Again, the conditions attending the birth of the new party
militated against its success. The fact that it arose out of the
fight for the Republican nomination obscured whatever high principles
and disinterested striving were involved, and made many people re-
gard the irrogressives as a faction of dissatisfied Republicans.
Another reason for the Progressive failure v/as the out-
break of the European War, in 1914. As the war progressed, and as
oreign relations became strained, the thoughts of the people grad-
ually turned from social progress within the nation to national de-
fense against possible aggression from without
. Loreover, the new
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prei aredness propaganda led to the practical desertion of Col.
Koosevelt from the party, in perfect consistency with his belief that
"No triumph of peace is quite so great as tiie supreme triumphs of
war . " ( 1
)
i'inally, v;e must name as an important cauLe of the failure
of the Progressive i?arty "that which," says Professor Buck, "has
caused the failure of every third party movement since the Civil V/ar,-
the innate political conservatism of the hulk of the American people.
Although recognising that the isisues which originally divided the
old parties have largely passed away, they prefer, even though it
may be a somewhat slower process, to bring forward the ne\T issues
and to work out the desired reforms in the established parties rather
than to attempt to displace them vi^ith new organizations," (1)
The Results of the Progressive Party .
Granting that the Progressive Party was not permanent nor
successful as a party, we may tentatively (because it yet too soon
for true historical judgment) estimate the results of its existence
somewhat as follov/s:
It had of course, a definite effect uf-on the election of
1912. The existence of the Progressive Party almost forced the Demo-
crats to nominate a progressive candidate. Then, too, the Progressive
(1) Roosevelt, American Ideals 25.
(2) Turner Assays in American History 164 Buck, " Independent
J^arties in the V/est"
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rarty split the Hepablican vote, making impossible the re-election
of Taft. and assuring the choice of Wilson.
Prom the viewpoint of the advocates of woman suffrage, the
Progressive Party did a real service in popularizing equal suffrage.
The Progressives were the first large party to have the courage
openly to endorse woman suffrage, and they illustrated their atti-
tude by the honor rendered to liiss Jane AddairiB and other women who
assumed a high place in the councils of the Party.
Undoubtedly, the Progressive Party had a real effect upon
national and state legislation, during the Wilson administration.
In accordance with the planks of the platform, the Pro-
gressives soon prepared a "Progressive Congressional Program" of bil]f
to be presented in Congress, fl) Of course, few or none of these
bills were adopted in the form in which the Progressives presented
them; but they kept the issues alive in Congress, and tended to
direct more attention to so-called"social " and other "progressive"
legislation. The Progressives may be credited 7/ith some part in
securing (either through propaganda or through actual advocacy and
voting in Congress) such measures as the establishment of the Depart-
ment of Labor, the Income Tax, the Parcels Post, the direct election
of United States Senators, the establishment of a Federal Trade
(1) Progressive national Service
,
"Progressive Corigressional Program"
Hew York., Jaji., 1914. cf. also Murdock, Victor- "The Hecord
*
of the Progressives in Congress"; reprinted from the Congress-
ional Hecord of Aug. 18. 1914.
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Cornmlssion, the Clayton Law, the Child Labor Law, etc. (1)
In the sphere of state legislation, too. the x^rogreseives
and their campaigns "loosened the public mind to a ran-e of ideas
which had long strug^^ded for a hearing; '^(2) while 'Vrogressivo Law-
making in many States" (3) furthered the adoption of social legisla-
tion regarding Child Labor, Vocational Training, Mothers' Pensions,
Minimum V/age. Factory and iiousiio^, V/ork men's Compensation, and




The Progressives made also certain constructive contribu-
tions to political procedure and methods. They created a new type
of party platform, with its clear-cut statement of beliefs and
policies, and with its timely, strengthening of the socialization
of politics, by proclaiming social welfare as a proper object of
political activity. The Progressives also carried into practice the
idea of the "open caucus" in Congress (5); and they introduced the
plan, though they did not demonstrate much of the practice of a
(1) The May, 1917 isoue of the Political Science Review is raid to
contain a review of the legislation of the Wilson administrationbut the journal has not been available in time for referencem preparing this chapter.
(2) Survey XX2VI, 504 ( June 17, 1916 )
(3) Rev. Revs. 48: 84-9 ( July 1915 )
(4) ibid.
(6) Rev. Revs. 47:546 ( Iviay 1913 )
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" service bureau" maintained by a political pta-ty. (l
)
One important result of the Progressive Party v/as the
counter reformation in the Republican Party, with the re-apportion-
ment Of national convention delegates, and the limiting of the num-
ber of Southern shadow delegates.
But the greatest result of the Progressive Party is, after
all. intangible and not easily evaluated. Above all else, the Pro-
gressive Party was a convincing demonstraL-ion of the strength and
depth uf the popular sentiiiient in favor of the cause of Practical
Democracy. The hurrying of so many social reformers
. scholars
, and
others to the Progressive standard showed tmit a good many people
had been merely waiting for a chance to ezpress their Progressivism.
A party which could organize in June, select its candidates in Aug-
ust, and poll 4,000,000 votes in November, had enough nat^ vital-
ity to make it a force to be reckoned with. The Progressive Party
was undoubtedly the means of awakenin, a large number of people to
conditions a^id abuses that needed reform, and of demonstrating to
them how many other people were working for the same reforms.
The Progressive rarty seems to have be n a transient organ-
ization, not destined to endure; but its influence has not been lost,
and when the history of our contemporary movement for Practical
Democracy is finally written, an important chapter will be given to
the life of the Progressive Party of 1912.
(1) Progressive National Service, Progressive Congressional ProgramII. Y., 191^ is one publication of this bui-eau. It contains
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